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ABSTRACT
We investigate the long-term impact of early exposure to Berlusconi’s commercial TV
network, Mediaset, on voting behavior and civic engagement in Italy. To do so, we
exploit differences in Mediaset signal reception across Italian municipalities due to the
network’s staggered introduction over the national territory and to idiosyncratic geo-
morphological factors. We find that municipalities exposed to Mediaset prior to 1985
exhibit greater electoral support for Berlusconi’s party in 1994, when he first ran for
office, relative to municipalities that were exposed only later on. This difference, esti-
mated between 1 and 2 percentage points, is extremely robust and tends to persist in the
following four elections. This effect can hardly be attributed to differential exposure to
partisan news bias since, prior to 1985, content on Mediaset channels was dominated
by light-entertainment programs and no news programs were broadcast until 1991, by
which time the network was accessible to the entire population. Instead, we present
evidence that early exposure to commercial TV was associated with a substantial de-
cline in social capital consistent with the diffusion of a culture of individualism and
civic disengagement that favored the political success of Berlusconi.
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1. INTRODUCTION
There is increasing evidence that media, particularly television, can influence viewers’ po-
litical behavior. Most studies on the topic have focused on the effect of exposure to partisan
bias in the news on voting. For example, DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) find that exposure
to Fox News (a conservative news network) had a significant positive effect on vote share
for the Republican Party in the U.S. 2000 presidential elections. Enikolopov et al. (2011)
look instead at the effect of NTV (the only national TV channel independent from the gov-
ernment) on electoral outcomes in the 1999 Russian parliamentary elections, and find that
access to NTV was associated with higher support for opposition parties.
However, news-related programs represent only a fraction of total airtime, and other types
of content may also influence viewers’ political attitudes in other, possibly subtler ways.
Previous studies have discussed how access to commercial TV and to specific categories of
non-informative content (e.g. light entertainment shows, soap operas, advertising) by ex-
posing viewers to particular cultural models, can have a significant and persistent impact on
various aspects of non-political behavior. In his path-breaking work on social capital, Put-
nam (2000) indicates the diffusion of television - and of entertainment programs in particular
- as one of the possible causes of the decline in civic engagement in the U.S. during the post-
war period. Related work by Olken (2009) finds a negative relationship between the number
of TV channels available across different areas of Indonesia and various measures of social
capital. Along similar lines, recent work has uncovered significant effects of commercial TV
on fertility choices and divorce rates in Brazil (Chong et al., 2008; Chong and La Ferrara,
2009), women’s empowerment in India (Jensen and Oster, 2009), and consumption choices
by former Eastern Germans after re-unification (Bursztyn and Cantoni, 2012).
To the extent that adherence to new cultural models influences individual political views
and voting choices, exposure to TV could have important and long-lasting political conse-
quences even in the absence of explicit news bias. We investigate the political impact of
non-informative media content in the context of Italy where, over the past three decades, the
relation between mass media and the political system has been particularly close. In par-
ticular, we examine whether early exposure to Berlusconi’s private TV network, Mediaset,
during the 1980s was associated with higher electoral support for Berlusconi’s party in 1994
- when he first ran for office - and in later elections. Our empirical analysis is based on the
comparison between areas that had access to Mediaset signal prior to 1985 and areas that
were exposed to it only later on. To this end, we combine unique information on the early
availability of Mediaset channels at the municipal level with data on electoral outcomes for
the period 1976-2013. Since Mediaset transmitters operating in 1985 were inherited from a
2
multitude of local TV stations that were progressively incorporated into the network, it is un-
likely that their geographic distribution was directly functional to the later political ambitions
of Berlusconi. Furthermore, our empirical strategy allows us to account for the (potentially
endogenous) location and power of the transmitters and to focus on the residual variation
in Mediaset signal intensity attributable to idiosyncratic geomorphological factors, which
should be uncorrelated with other determinants of voting. Evidence from electoral outcomes
in the pre-exposure period (1976-1979) allows for an indirect test of this orthogonality con-
dition.
Our findings document that municipalities that were exposed to Mediaset early on displayed
a significantly higher vote share for Berlusconi in 1994. The effect, between 1 and 2 per-
centage points, is very precisely estimated and persists in the four elections that followed,
up until 2008 - almost twenty-five years after the differential exposure to Mediaset and fif-
teen years after Berlusconi first entered politics. The results are remarkably similar when we
restrict the comparison to municipalities with signal intensity just above and just below the
threshold of good quality reception, or to pairs of neighboring municipalities that, in the ab-
sence of geomorphological obstacles, would have similar signal intensity. The documented
effect does not vary across municipalities with different population size, but, interestingly,
appears to be stronger in areas where people spend more time watching TV.
To further corroborate our findings we combine the data on signal availability with survey
data from the Italian National Election Study for the period 1994-2006, which include rich
information on political attitudes, media consumption, and a range of individual characteris-
tics. The individual-data analysis confirms that subjects living in areas with early access to
Mediaset were more likely to vote for Berlusconi’s party in 1994 and subsequent elections.
Furthermore, using information on the respondents’ year of birth, we are also able to dissect
the average effect of Mediaset across different age groups. In this respect, we uncover a
U-shaped relation with the effect of early exposure to Mediaset being especially pronounced
for younger and older voters, indeed the categories of individuals that tend to spend more
time watching TV. In particular, the very large impact on the younger generations - estimated
around 10 percentage points - can go some way in explaining why the effect persisted for
over two decades.
Overall, our findings point to a significant and long-lasting effect of TV on electoral results.
However, unlike the cases studied by DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) and Enikolopov et al.
(2011), the documented effect can hardly be reconciled with a “partisan-bias-in-news” ex-
planation. In fact no news programs were broadcast on Mediaset until 1991, at which time
the network was already available to the entire Italian population. Indeed, during the first
half of the 1980s - that is, when people were differentially exposed - Mediaset channels were
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devoted exclusively to light-entertainment programs such as soap operas, action dramas, quiz
and gossip shows. These categories of content are mostly blamed by Putnam (2000) for the
anti-civic effects of television, in contrast with news and other information programs, which
are at the top of his pro-civicness hierarchy. The advent of Mediaset produced a substantial
shock to both the “quantity” of TV available to Italian viewers - the number of available
channels increased from three to six - and to its “quality”, shifting content from news and
educational content toward light-entertainment programs. According to Putnam’s argument,
both these changes would result in a decrease in civic engagement among those individuals
that were (longer) exposed to Mediaset, which, in turn, could affect their voting behavior.
We explore this hypothesis by looking at the empirical relationship between early exposure
to Mediaset, civic engagement and voting behavior. On the one hand, using municipal data
on the number of voluntarily associations (one of the measures proposed by Putnam), we
find that civic engagement declined significantly between 1981 and 1991 (and then between
1991 and 2001) in areas that had access to Mediaset before 1985 relative to those that did not.
On the other hand, we find civic engagement to be strongly negatively correlated with elec-
toral support for Berlusconi’s party both at the individual and at the municipal level. These
findings are consistent with the view that Mediaset favored the diffusion of a culture of indi-
vidualism and civic disengagement which, later on, would favor the success of Berlusconi’s
political message.
It is worth noting that our results do not exclude the possibility that Berlusconi may have also
benefited from favorable news slant on Mediaset channels (previously documented by Du-
rante and Knight, 2012). However, since this effect should only bite after 1991, when news-
casts were first introduced on Mediaset, it should affect all municipalities in a similar fashion
regardless of whether they had access to Mediaset before or after 1985. In other words, to
the extent that early access to Mediaset is not correlated with post-1991 news consumption,
any effect of pro-Berlusconi news bias should not affect the estimation of our coefficient
of interest. Indeed, evidence from individual survey data seems to exclude that individuals
that were exposed to Mediaset prior to 1985 were more likely than others to watch news on
Mediaset in later years - for example because of habit formation or attachment to the net-
work. Furthermore, early and late Mediaset viewers do not seem to differ systematically in
their opinion about Berlusconi’s qualities as a man and a politician (such as honesty, ability,
and trustworthiness). This suggests that early Mediaset viewers were not more exposed (or
vulnerable) to pro-Berlusconi propaganda, but, rather, that they filtered the same information
through a different system of values which was presumably influenced by their prior expo-
sure to Mediaset and made them more receptive to Berlusconi’s political message. Indeed,
greater support for Berlusconi’s party by early Mediaset viewers seems to reflect a particu-
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lar affinity to its political platform and not a general sympathy towards Berlusconi himself
which may extend to domains other than politics. To test this hypothesis we look at whether
areas exposed to Mediaset earlier also display higher support for Berlusconi’s football team
A.C. Milan, presumably the best known non-political venture commonly associated with his
name, and we find no evidence in this sense.
Overall, our findings indicate that exposure to commercial TV can affect viewers’ political
attitudes and voting behavior even in the absence of news coverage. Our results complement
previous studies on the impact of news slant, including recent work by Barone et al. (2012) on
the consequences of partisan bias on Mediaset news.1 Our argument is that the introduction
of commercial television had additional and farther-reaching implications for Italy’s recent
political history, which may reflect deeper social trends triggered by early exposure to new,
media-fueled cultural models.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background infor-
mation on the evolution of Italy’s political system and broadcast television industry over the
period of interest. Section 3 describes the data used in the empirical analysis and discusses
the identification strategy. Section 4 presents the main findings. Section 5 discusses alter-
native interpretations of the results and presents additional evidence to help distinguishing
between them. Section 6 concludes.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1. THE RISE OF COMMERCIAL TV IN ITALY
Since its foundation in 1954 and for over twenty years the state-owned TV corporation (RAI)
maintained the absolute monopoly over TV broadcasting in Italy. Throughout this period
private companies were not allowed to broadcast on the Italian territory.2 In 1976, following
a ruling by the Italian Constitutional Court, this ban was removed allowing private companies
to broadcast though only at the local level. This triggered a rapid expansion in the number of
private broadcasting companies, mostly small local actors, which reached 256 in 1977 and
over 400 in 1978 (Menduni, 2002).
1 Using electoral data on local elections in Italy’s Piedmont region, the authors document a sizeable decline in
electoral support for the Berlusconi-led centre-right coalition in provinces that switched to digital TV before
the elections relative to provinces that switched only after. To the extent that the introduction of digital TV
diluted the audience share of Mediaset news programs, the authors interpret this finding as evidence that
partisan news bias on Mediaset channels may affect electoral outcomes.
2 This regulation was motivated by the consideration that the state would better protect and guarantee the
impartiality, objectivity and completeness of the television service (ruling 59/1960 by the Constitutional
Court).
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In addition to small local entrepreneurs, the prospects of large advertising revenues attracted
the interest of a few large business groups which started investing in commercial TV. With
the purpose of circumventing the legal ban on ultra-local transmission, these groups es-
tablished broadcast syndication agreements by which several formally independent stations
would simultaneously broadcast the same content in different local markets. Among the
most important ones were Canale 5, launched by Berlusconi in 1980, Prima Rete, Italia 1
and Rete 4, controlled respectively by the Rizzoli, the Rusconi and the Mondadori group.
Very soon, however, the stiff competition and a climate of great regulatory uncertainty led
some of these groups to reconsider their strategy. In 1981 a new ruling by the Constitutional
Court, confirming the ban on ultra-local transmission, induced Prima Rete to leave the mar-
ket, and convinced the Rusconi and the Mondadori group that antitrust legislation was on its
way. Only Berlusconi was prepared to sail closest to the wind (Ginsborg, 2005). Bordering
on illegality, he extended his network and explicitly grouped the stations under the common
logo of Canale 5. In the absence of any intervention on the part of the legislator he then used
Canale 5’s soaring advertising revenues to acquire two additional channels from his more
cautious competitors, Italia 1 in 1982 and Rete 4 in 1984. The three channels were then
incorporated into Berlusconi’s holding Fininvest, which later became Mediaset.
The fate of Mediaset, however, remained vulnerable to possible initiatives by legislators and
judicial officials aimed at enforcing the legal restrictions on private broadcasting, which the
group had until then ignored. In fact, on October 16, 1984, the attorneys of Turin, Pescara
and Rome ordered that Mediaset transmitters be switched off, accusing the network of violat-
ing the 1976 ruling by the Constitutional Court. A few days later, however, the government
led by Bettino Craxi - leader of the Italian Socialist Party and Berlusconi’s long-term po-
litical sponsor - issued an emergency decree which removed all geographic restrictions to
broadcasting by private companies. The decree - which was initially rejected by the Parlia-
ment but forcefully reiterated until finally approved a few months later - would represent a
landmark in the evolution of the Italian television system, legalizing Berlusconi’s de facto
monopoly over private broadcasting.
If until then the uncertain legal prospects had delayed the expansion of Mediaset’s network,
once assured that its dominant position would not be threatened, Berlusconi’s group multi-
plied its efforts to acquire new transmitters and expand its coverage to the entire population.
According to the data used in our empirical analysis, at the beginning of 1985 Mediaset
operated about 1,700 transmitters, inherited from the former members of the broadcast syn-
dication. In fact, Mediaset never built its own antennas, finding it cheaper to use those of
the small local televisions that were progressively incorporated into the network. The lat-
ter had been conceived to reach a local audience and lacked the power of RAI transmitters,
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so that Mediaset channels could be received with good quality signal by about 50% of the
population.
By 1987, however, the number of Mediaset transmitters had doubled to 3,800 and Mediaset
channels were accessible to about 87% of the population (Constitutional Court, 1988). Fi-
nally, by the end of 1990 Mediaset coverage attained 98% of the population, comparable to
that of public channels (Constitutional Court, 1988). By that time the Parliament had ap-
proved a new Telecommunication Law which largely confirmed the regulatory framework of
the 1985 decree and limited the possibility for the state to assign new broadcasting licenses to
other actors, thus ratifying the existence of the RAI-Mediaset duopoly which would persist
until these days.
Interestingly, public and private channels differed markedly in terms of programming sched-
ules. Indeed, many entertainment programs launched by Mediaset in the early 1980s rep-
resented an absolute novelty in the Italian television landscape, which would profoundly
influence Italians’ lifestyle models over the following years. Most of the airtime was de-
voted to foreign TV series, particularly action dramas and soap operas; the rest consisted
of internal productions, primarily quiz, gossip and light entertainment shows. According
to many observers, such programs contributed to the diffusion of a new cultural model in
Italy, centered around values of individualism, materialism and hedonism, which differed
markedly from the one based on Catholic values such as family and solidarity.(Porro and
Russo, 2000; Ginsborg, 2005)
This new model is well exemplified by the figures of yuppies and playboys that populated
these shows, with females characters generally relegated to the role of sexual bodies (Za-
nardo, 2010; Benini, 2012). On the contrary, news programs were not broadcast on Mediaset
until 1991 when, in the midst of the first Iraqi war, Italia 1 news service was established,
followed one year later by the other channels. The absence of newscasts on Mediaset was
partly due to the fact that, until 1990, private stations were not allowed to broadcast live,
which made virtually impossible to transmit news bulletins. Other types of informative or
educational programs (i.e. talk shows, investigative reports, documentaries) were also very
scant on Mediaset channels. In general, Berlusconi’s revolutionary television-making style
stood in sheer contrast with the pedagogical nature of the public TV, which at that time de-
voted a large share of airtime to newscasts, documentaries, and family films. His approach
quickly proved very successful: according to Nielsen data reported by the Constitutional
Court (1988), the audience share for Mediaset channels reached 44.7% in 1987, just below
that of RAI channels (48.3%); by the same time, Mediaset had already surpassed RAI with
regard to total advertising revenue.
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2.2. THE ITALIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM AND BERLUSCONI’S ENTRY INTO POLITICS
According to several of his long-time associates, and to his own account, Silvio Berlusconi
had no intention to get personally involved in politics until 1993, when a series of corruption
scandals led to the collapse of Italy’s ruling parties and the abrupt decline of his long-time
political patron, Bettino Craxi, until then powerful leader of the Italian Socialist Party (PSI).3
A historically left-leaning party, the PSI formed part of the coalition led by the Christian
Democrats which had uninterruptedly governed Italy since 1963. While a more conservative
component had always existed within the PSI, this finally took control of the party in 1976
when Craxi was elected party secretary. The new leader cut the residual links with the left
and enthusiastically embraced market-oriented reforms, overturning the Christian Democrats
at the center-right of the political spectrum. By doing so he acquired a pivotal position in
the political arena, which eventually allowed him to become Prime Minister in the coalition
government that emerged after the 1983 elections. Under Craxi the PSI enjoyed growing
political success largely due to its leader’s ability to promote a more modern and appealing
image of the party. In the words of Ginsborg (2005), “Craxi offered a modernizing veneer
which Italy’s two major parties, the Christian Democrats and Communists, both lacked (...)
under his leadership, politics were to be personalized and simplified, they were to have a
strong showbiz element, their principal medium was to be television”. Indeed, Craxi was
among the first ones to recognize the potential impact of commercial TV; from very early
on he became Berlusconi’s close friend and political sponsor and, as mentioned above, he
would play a crucial role in insuring the survival and further consolidation of Berlusconi’s
media empire.
The political fortunes of Craxi and his party came to an abrupt end with the outbreak of a
series of corruption scandals (known as Tangentopoli, Italian for “Bribeville”) for which,
between 1992 and 1993, the entire leadership of the PSI was put on trial. Craxi himself was
sentenced to ten years of jail time and avoided prison only by escaping to Tunisia, where
he died a few years later. The Christian Democrats and the other parties of the conservative
coalition also paid a heavy toll to the scandals and virtually disappeared from the political
scene. These events represented a turning point in Italy’s recent political history, marking
the transition from the so-called “First Republic” to the Second one. In the wake of the
emergency, a temporary technocratic government was instituted and, after a 1993 popular
referendum had modified the electoral system from a proportional to a (mostly) majoritarian
one, early elections were set to be held in March 1994.
3 See for instance the testimony of Ezio Cartotto, a then close collaborator of Berlusconi, reported in Veltri
and Travaglio (2009).
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The prospects looked pretty dire for Mediaset at the time: the group faced serious financial
difficulties, had lost its political sponsors, and feared the possible electoral success of the
Democratic Party - the heir of Italy’s Communist Party - which had remained largely un-
touched by the scandals and looked as the likely winner of the incoming elections. Indeed,
the left-wing party had been traditionally critical of Mediaset’s dominant position, and advo-
cated a general reform of the media industry. After careful consideration Berlusconi decided
to take action and in December of 1993, three months before the elections, he announced the
creation of a new political party, Forza Italia (“Forward Italy”), which aspired to occupy the
political space left open by the disappearance of the traditional center-right parties.
The new party brought to the extreme consequences the personalization and spectaculariza-
tion of politics initiated with Craxi and the PSI, leading Seisselberg (1996) to define Forza
Italia as a “media-mediated personality-party”. This was apparent in many aspects of the
new party’s organization and campaigning; for example, the announcement of Berlusconi’s
decision to “enter the field” (one of the frequent football metaphors in Berlusconi’s speeches)
was filmed at his home and aired simultaneously on all three Mediaset channels. Also, the
party coordinators and many of the top candidates were selected from the ranks of Mediaset
and among the popular figures populating Mediaset prime-time shows. Finally, the selec-
tion and training of candidates was entirely entrusted to Publitalia, Mediaset’s advertising
division (Hopkin and Paolucci, 1999).
Forza Italia’s innovative and aggressive communication strategy proved very successful, and
in only two months Berlusconi’s coalition - which also included the post-fascist Alleanza
Nazionale (“National Alliance”) and the separatist Lega Nord (“Northern League”) - man-
aged to close the gap with its competitors. In the elections of March 1994 Forza Italia
became Italy’s most voted party with 21% of the votes (outscoring the Democratic Party by
a tiny margin), and the center-right coalition gained a solid majority in both branches of Par-
liament. On May 10th 1994 Berlusconi was sworn in as Italy’s Prime Minister for the first
time.4 However, Berlusconi’s first governmental experience would be short-lived; in Jan-
uary 1995 the Lega Nord withdraw its parliamentary support, forcing Berlusconi to resign
and paving the way to a new technocratic government which would govern Italy until new
elections were held in early 1996.
Nevertheless, the emergence and swift success of Berlusconi’s party would produce a dra-
matic and long-lasting transformation of Italy’s political landscape whose consequences
would persist until these days. Indeed, twenty years and five elections later, Berlusconi
remains the uncontested leader of the conservative front and, over time, his distinctive politi-
4 Figure 1 summarizes the timing of the main events described above.
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cal style - characterized by an aggressive rhetoric and a pervasive use of the media - has been
emulated even by his political adversaries (though with much less success). The right panel
of Figure A.2 summarizes the evolution of electoral support for Berlusconi’s center-right
coalition over the period 1994-2013: out of the six national elections held over this period,
Berlusconi’s coalition prevailed by a large margin in 1994, 2001, and 2008, and lost by a
very small margin in 1996, 2006, and 2013.5
According to many commentators Berlusconi’s control of commercial TV has been decisive
both for his early electoral success and for his extraordinary political longevity. However,
there is little evidence of whether exposure to Mediaset actually affected voting for Berlus-
coni’s party, how persistent this effect might have been, and through which channel it may
have operated. In what follows we attempt to shed light on these questions by examining
empirically the link between exposure to Mediaset before 1985 - i.e. when geographic differ-
ences in the network coverage were still considerable - and electoral support for Berlusconi’s
party in 1994 and in the following elections.
3. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
We aim to estimate the long-term impact of the introduction of commercial TV in Italy
on voting behavior across Italian municipalities. To do so, we need information on access
to Mediaset in the early stages of the network’s diffusion, when geographic differences in
coverage were still wide. Data on the distribution of Mediaset viewers in the early 1980s
are unfortunately not available and, in any case, actual viewership rates would measure an
equilibrium outcome - possibly correlated with a range of socio-economic confounds - rather
than an exogenous source of variation.
Instead, we construct a measure of Mediaset availability, across narrow geographical areas,
based on the location and technical characteristics of its transmitters in year 1985. Estimating
the causal effect of exposure to Mediaset on later electoral outcomes requires that Mediaset
availability before 1985 is exogenous to voting behavior over the period 1994-2013. Some
of the facts discussed in the previous section suggest that this is actually the case.
First of all, the transmitting apparatus was inherited from the local networks that were pro-
gressively incorporated into the broadcast syndication. Therefore, the exact location and
5 If until recently the Italian political landscape was largely dominated by the center-right and center-left
coalitions, in the 2013 elections both coalitions lost considerable support to the advantage of other parties.
One new political movement, in particular, the Five-Star Movement (M5S), emerged as the largest electoral
force obtaining 25.5% of the votes. Led by blogger and former comedian Beppe Grillo, the M5S started
in 2005 as a web-based grassroots protest movement extremely critical of mainstream parties and media,
and later on consolidated into an organized political actor running for elections first at the local level, and,
finally, at the national level.
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power of the transmitters were never chosen by Mediaset, which always avoided (mainly for
economic reasons) to get involved in the construction of new antennas. Of course it is still
possible, at least in principle, that the syndicate targeted local televisions located in areas
that were deemed somehow strategical from an electoral perspective (e.g. marginal electoral
districts, or districts with a large share of swing voters). However, the totally muted political
conditions between the early 1980s and 1994 (specifically, a different electoral rule and a dif-
ferent party system) would have frustrated any such strategy. Most importantly, Berlusconi’s
decision to pursue a political career matured just a few months before the 1994 elections, in
the wake of political upheavals - the Tangentopoli scandals and the collapse of Italy’s “First
Republic” - which were unforeseeable back in the early 1980s.
For all these reasons, we can reasonably exclude that the geographical expansion of Medi-
aset before 1985 was (intentionally) driven by the later political ambitions of Berlusconi.
Nevertheless, our empirical analysis will exploit only variation in Mediaset availability that
is largely driven by idiosyncratic geomorphological factors, rather than by the (potentially
endogenous) location and power of the transmitters. In this way, we also reduce the scope
for spurious correlation due to variation in omitted factors.
We next discuss in detail our data and identification strategy, and we provide some indirect
tests of our main identification assumptions.
3.1. DATA ON SIGNAL INTENSITY
Broadcast television signal is transmitted over the air according to the laws of physics for
electromagnetic propagation. In the free space, signal strength decreases in the square of
the distance from the transmitter; in practice, however, the patterns of decay are much more
complex due to diffraction caused by mountains and other obstacles. We compute the inten-
sity of Mediaset’s signal in early 1985 using a professional engineer-developed software that
simulates signal propagation according to the Longley-Rice Irregular Terrain Model (ITM)
algorithm.
The ITM was originally developed by the US government for frequency-planning purposes
and allows one to accurately predict signal strength across narrow geographical cells (Phillips
et al., 2011). The version used in this paper is described in Hufford (2002) and has been
previously used by Olken (2009),Yanagizawa-Drott (2010), Enikolopov et al. (2011) and
DellaVigna et al. (2012).
To implement the ITM algorithm we combine information on transmitters’ location and
power with a high-resolution geo-orographic map of Italy. Detailed data on the location
and technical characteristics of the 1,700 Mediaset transmitters operating in 1985 was ob-
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tained directly from the Mediaset group. For each transmitter the documentation includes
one technical report sheet indicating the latitude, longitude, altitude and height of the trans-
mitter’s location, as well as its transmitting power and frequency (a sample technical report
sheet is reported in Appendix Figure A.4).
Using the ITM algorithm we compute Mediaset signal intensity in decibels (dB) at the cen-
troid of all the 8,100 Italian municipalities (comune). Municipalities are Italy’s lowest ad-
ministrative units and are fairly small both in terms of surface (mean of 37.2 km2, median of
21.8 km2) and population (mean and median equal to 7,010 and 2,296 people, respectively).6
Descriptive statistics for our complete sample are reported in Table 1.
Figure A.1 reports the distribution of signal intensity across Italian municipalities. While
signal intensity ranges from -114 dB to +40 dB, most municipalities display values around
zero, that is, the value above which signal reception is perfect; as signal strength turns neg-
ative, reception deteriorates considerably. However, in the absence of data on the number of
Mediaset viewers in 1985, the precise relationship between signal and reception can only be
inferred from previous studies.
Using survey data on viewership of 11 TV channels in Indonesia, for example, Olken (2009)
finds that for values of signal intensity below -50 the share of individuals able to watch a
given channel is close to zero; viewership increases as signal gets larger, reaching 100%
when signal becomes positive. Bursztyn and Cantoni (2012) perform a similar exercise and
find that the share of individuals able to receiveWestern TV in various areas of East Germany
increased from about 0 to 80% when signal intensity passed from -86.3 dB to -75.9 dB, thus
pointing at better reception at relatively lower levels of signal intensity than Olken (2009)’s
findings. Finally, Enikolopov et al. (2011) estimate that a unit increase in signal strength of
the independent Russian network NTV is associated with an average increase in the share
of viewers of 0.3 percentage points; however, they do not distinguish between areas with
positive and negative signal intensity.
Taken together, this evidence confirms that in areas with positive signal intensity all people
are exposed, while reception is poorer (and possibly nil) in areas with negative predicted
signal. Although the relationship between signal and viewership is not stable across countries
and/or periods, it is reasonable to expect that most of the variation in exposure should occur
at intermediate values of signal intensity; at the opposite, even large differences in signal
strength at both extremes of the distribution should have little or no effect on the quality
of reception. To focus on the relevant source of variation, in most of our analysis we will
exclude municipalities in the top and bottom 2.5% of the signal distribution (see Figure
6 Figures were very similar in 1981, around the time commercial television was introduced in Italy.
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A.1).7
3.2. ESTIMATING EQUATION
In the absence of data on actual Mediaset viewers in 1985, we focus on the direct effect
of Mediaset signal intensity. Our approach is the same used by Yanagizawa-Drott (2010)
and differs from the one used by Olken (2009) and Enikolopov et al. (2011), who have
also information on the number of viewers and use signal intensity as an instrument for
viewership rates in a two-stage-least-square (2SLS) framework. In contrast, we estimate
the reduced form coefficient of exposure to Mediaset or, equivalently, the intention-to-treat
effect.8
Our identification strategy exploits variation in signal intensity across otherwise similar mu-
nicipalities. To account for the potentially endogenous location of the transmitters, we sim-
ulate what would be the hypothetical signal intensity given the true location and power of
the transmitters, but in the absence of any geomorphological obstacles (i.e. assuming terrain
is flat). The actual signal intensity and the hypothetical signal intensity in the absence of
obstacles are shown in Figure 2. Comparing the two measures within relatively small areas,
allows us to disentangle the part of signal intensity that is explained by idiosyncratic terrain
characteristics: this is exactly the type of variation that we exploit in our empirical analysis.
In particular, we follow Olken (2009) and regress our outcomes of interest on signal intensity
(Signal) controlling for signal intensity under the flat terrain hypothesis (SignalFree). The
underlying idea is that, keeping SignalFree constant, the coefficient of Signal is identified by
residual variation due to idiosyncratic differences in topography, rather than by the (poten-
tially endogenous) location and power of the transmitters. Of course, terrain characteristics
could potentially affect the socio-economic environment in other ways; for example, terrain
ruggedness could affect the density of population and/or economic activity. To address this
concern, in our main specification we control for a range of additional geographic variables,
including the municipality’s area and its square, average altitude and its square, and average
terrain ruggedness.
We also include two sets of fixed effects: electoral districts (EDs) and local labor markets
(LLM). There are 475 electoral districts, which generally include multiple adjacent munic-
ipalities within a given province. LLMs are instead defined by the Italian National Statis-
7 All results remain qualitatively unchanged when including all observations, some of these results are re-
ported in Appendix Table A.1.
8 Bursztyn and Cantoni (2012) employ yet another approach, assigning German municipalities into treat-
ment and control group when signal intensity is above or below the one available in a particular location
(Dresden), which corresponds presumably to a large increase in the quality of reception.
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tical Institute (ISTAT) on the basis of workers’ commuting patterns. There are 686 LLMs,
which (unlike EDs) can include adjacent municipalities belonging to different provinces or
regions.9
Therefore, identification of the effects of interest exploits residual variation across munici-
palities that face the same political and economic conditions (respectively, the same candi-
dates and similar labor market opportunities). This is a very demanding exercise, as EDs and
LLMs are narrow geographical areas, much smaller than provinces (the administrative unit
just above municipalities in the EU-NUTS classification)10.
The following estimating equation summarizes our empirical strategy:
ym = bSignalm+ gSignalFreem+d 0Tm+Di(m) +Lj(m) + em (1)
where ym is the outcome of interest in municipality m; Signalm and SignalFreem are, re-
spectively, Mediaset’s actual signal intensity in 1985 and the hypothetical signal intensity
assuming flat terrain; Tm is a vector of municipal characteristics including area and its square,
altitude and its square, and average terrain ruggedness index; Di(m) and Lj(m) are the fixed
effects for, respectively, the i-th electoral district and the j-th local labor market in which the
municipality is located, and em is an error term. To make the estimates representative at the
national level even in the presence of heterogeneous effects across municipalities, we weigh
observations by municipality population in 1981; standard errors are clustered by electoral
district.11
Under the assumption that Signal is independent of em, the OLS coefficient b consistently es-
timates the causal effect of Signal on y. While such assumption is fundamentally untestable,
in Table 2 we document the (absence of) correlation between Signal and several municipal
characteristics that could potentially affect voting behavior. To facilitate the interpretation of
the results, we normalize Signal dividing it by its standard deviation. Although the univari-
ate correlation coefficients (in column 1) generally differ from zero, most of this correlation
is absorbed by the other variables on the right-hand side of equation (see column 2). Com-
paring the R2 coefficients in columns 1 and 2, the joint variation in SignalFree, topography,
and fixed effects explains between 60 and 90 percent of the overall variation for most vari-
ables. Once these additional variables are controlled for, Signal is no longer correlated with
9 Appendix Figure A.3 provides an example of the distribution of EDs and LLMs in the mid-sized region of
Abruzzo.
10 The median area across districts and LLMs is 527 and 352 square kilometers, respectively, as opposed to
2,246 for provinces.
11 The results are analogous (and, indeed, generally stronger) when running the estimates on the unweighted
observations, some of these results are presented in Appendix Table A.1.
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population (levels, density and growth), labor market conditions, and the number of firms
per capita (also by class size). Signal continues to be correlated, instead, with educational
attainment and income per capita; in light of this, we will include both these variables as
additional controls in our specification.
We next present the data on electoral outcomes, and we conclude this section with another
indirect test of our key identification assumption.
3.3. ELECTORAL DATA
We obtained, from the Italian Ministry of Interior, municipality-level data on electoral out-
comes in all national elections held between year 1976 and 2013, including turnout, number
of blank and spoiled votes, and the number of votes cast for each party. Our main outcome
of interest in equation (1) is the share of votes obtained by Berlusconi’s parties: Forza Italia
(FI henceforth) between 1994 and 2006, and the Popolo Delle Libertà (PDL henceforth) in
2008 and 2013.12 We focus on voting for the Lower House (Camera) because the differ-
ent electoral system in the Upper House (Senato) fostered the formation of joint lists, often
changing across different areas of the country. For instance, in the 1994 elections Forza
Italia ran together with the Lega Nord in northern regions and with Alleanza Nazionale in
the south, so it is difficult to isolate the electoral support for each member of the coalition.
Summary statistics for the vote share of the FI-PDL are reported in Table 1.
We consider also the vote share of the other main parties in Italy. As discussed in section 2,
the Italian political system is traditionally characterized by a high degree of instability and
fragmentation, with the frequent formation and dissolution of parties and coalitions, which
culminated into the passage from the “First” to the “Second Republic” between 1992 and
1994. Nevertheless, we were able to track the evolution of 7 major parties (or groups of
parties) contemporaneous to the FI-PDL during the period 1994-2013: its traditional allies,
Alleanza Nazionale (AN, before it joined the PDL in 2007) and the Lega Nord (NL); a group
of minor parties at the centre of the political spectrum (CENTRE), which also joined the
centre-right coalition between 1996 and 2006, but run independently in the other elections;
the Democratic Party (PD), heir of the former Communist Party and the main party of the
centre-left; some minor parties allied of the PD (ALLIES) and, finally, some extremist leftist
parties (LEFT).
Going back to the First Republic, i.e. before the formation of Forza Italia, we include the
Italian Communist Party (PCI); all the members of the centre-right coalition led by the Chris-
12 The Popolo Delle Libertà (“People of Freedom”) party was created in 2007 from the merger of Forza Italia
and its traditional right-wing ally, Alleanza Nazionale.
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tian Democrats (DC) and the Italian Socialist Party of Bettino Craxi (PSI), which included
also three other minor parties, namely the Social-Democratic Party (PSDI), the Republican
Party (PRI) and the Liberal Party (PLI); finally, we include two non-aligned parties, the
neo-fascist Italian Social Movement (MSI) and the Radical Party (RP). Figure A.2 plots the
electoral support for the main parties and coalitions during the First and Second Republic
(years 1976-1992 and 1994-2013, respectively), while the Appendix Table A.3 contains a
brief description of each party.
3.4. PLACEBO ESTIMATES
We conclude this section by regressing the vote share of each party during the period 1976-
1992 on Signal and all the other variables in equation (1), namely Signal f ree, controls for
geomorphological characteristics, fixed effects for electoral district and local labor markets,
log per capita income and schooling. The coefficient of Signal in the estimated equation for
each party and year is reported in Table 3.
The first two rows correspond to the period before Mediaset started its transmissions in the
early 1980s. All coefficients are very close to zero and (largely) not statistically significant,
providing additional empirical support for the assumption that, conditional on the other con-
trol variables in equation (1), Mediaset signal intensity in 1985 is uncorrelated with other
determinants of voting behavior at the local level. Notice that such estimates would differ
from zero insofar as any determinant of voting behavior, both observed and unobserved, dif-
fers systematically between municipalities that were differentially exposed to Mediaset. In
this sense, the placebo estimates for the period 1976-1979 provide a compelling test of our
main identification assumption (even more than the balance tests in Table 2).
Turning to the period 1983-1992, i.e. after the introduction of Mediaset but before the cre-
ation of Forza Italia, the only notable change is represented by a significant increase in
electoral support for the PSI in municipalities with better reception of Mediaset channels.
The coefficient on Signal increases from 0.36 in 1979 (non-statistically significant) to 0.64
in 1992 (significant at the 5% level). This finding is, in many aspects, not surprising. As
we discussed in Section 2, the PSI adhered more to the values put forth by commercial TV
than traditional mass parties, such as the Christian Democrats and the Communists, whose
rhetoric was rather centered around family values and working class instances, respectively
(Ginsborg, 2005); in many aspects it can be considered as the precursor of Forza Italia. We
next examine the relationship between earlier exposure to Mediaset and the vote share of the
FI-PDL over the period 1994-2013.
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4. RESULTS
In what follows we estimate the effect of early exposure to Mediaset on electoral support
for Berlusconi’s party. We will also examine voting for the other main parties of the Second
Republic.
Table 1 reports the average and median vote share of the FI-PDL across Italian municipalities
in all national elections since 1994, distinguishing between municipalities with perfect and
less-than-perfect (or nil) reception of Mediaset before 1985 (Signal   0 and Signal < 0,
respectively). The vote share is consistently higher, by 1 to 2 percentage points on average,
in the first group of municipalities. We next examine whether such relationship is robust to
controlling in several ways for other differences between municipalities that were earlier and
later exposed.
4.1. BASELINE OLS ESTIMATES
In Table 4 we report several specifications of the OLS equation (1) for the effect of pre-1985
exposure to Mediaset on voting for FI in 1994, the first election in which Berlusconi ran for
office. The univariate regression in column 1, documents a positive relationship between
the actual intensity of Mediaset signal and voting for Berlusconi; the effect is statistically
significant at the 1% level and rather large, a one standard deviation increase in Signal cor-
responding to a 3-percentage-point increase in the vote share of FI.
In column 2 we control for signal intensity under the flat terrain hypothesis (SignalFree)
and in column 3 we add the geomorphological controls. The fact that the coefficient of
Signal remains unaffected suggests that endogeneity in the location and power of Mediaset
transmitters is not driving the result. Consistent with this, the univariate regression of FI’s
vote share on SignalFree is not significantly different from zero (coefficient -0.568, standard
error 0.483).
In column 4 we add electoral district and local labor market fixed effects. The point estimate
on Signal decreases to slightly less than 1 percentage point and remains virtually unaffected
in column 5, where we control in addition for the number of eligible voters, log-income per
capita, and education (i.e. the variables that were statistically significant in the balance test of
Table 2). The findings are basically unaffected when we run the estimates on the unweighted
sample or we do not trim municipalities on the tails of the distribution of Signal (Appendix
Table A.1.). Overall, these results suggest that earlier exposure to Mediaset (before 1985)
brought an electoral advantage to Berlusconi when he first ran for election one decade later
(in 1994).
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This effect is not short-lived. In Table 5, we estimate the same specification for all national
elections of the Second Republic: 1994, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2008 and 2013. Throughout
most of this period, the estimated coefficient of Signal remains very stable, between 0.7
and 1 percentage points. Therefore, voters that were longer exposed to Mediaset seem to
experience a persistent shift in political preferences, relative to voters that were exposed
only for a shorter period of time.
Such difference vanishes only in 2013, about 20 years after the entry of Berlusconi into
politics. As we already discussed in Section 2, the 2013 elections were characterized by a
profound disenchantment with all the major parties that dominated the political scene during
the Second Republic (analogously to what happened at the end of the First Republic in
1992). Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that the political message of Berlusconi
was greeted with skepticism, possibly also by voters that had been longer exposed to his own
televisions. Indeed, the PDL lost about 6.5 million of votes between 2008 and 2013, which
were evenly distributed across municipalities that were differentially exposed to Mediaset.
In Table 6 we compare the effect of Mediaset on FI-PDL with that on other parties over the
period 1994-2013. Interestingly, Berlusconi’s party is the only one that displays significantly
higher electoral support in areas exposed to Mediaset prior to 1985 in every election. In par-
ticular, the same pattern does not apply to the other members of the conservative coalition. In
fact, there is no impact on electoral support for Alleanza Nazionale, and we find evidence of
a negative and significant effect on the vote share of the Lega Nord, Berlusconi’s traditional
ally in the North. Such negative effect is especially pronounced in 1996 (-0.795, significant
at the 1% level), the only election in which the Lega did not join Berlusconi’s coalition. Pre-
1985 access to Mediaset is also associated with lower vote shares for the Democratic Party
and other left-wing parties (although this effect is not statistically significant for some elec-
tions).13 Although it may seem surprising that higher support for Berlusconi’s party among
early Mediaset viewers came at the expense of both the Lega and left-wing parties, this is
consistent with the fact that these parties catered primarily to working class voters (Tambini,
2001) which were likely to be particularly exposed to Mediaset content.
Figure 5 summarizes the results discussed above. The graph reports, on the horizontal axis,
the coefficient on Signal estimated using our baseline specification in separate regressions
of vote share for all parties in all elections, and, on the vertical axis, the corresponding t-
statistics; we distinguish the results for the pre-1983 elections (marked with Xs), for the
1983-1992 period (hollow circles), and for the post-1992 elections (solid circles). While no
13 In fact, the negative impact on the center-left parties is especially pronounced in the Center and Southern
regions: when focusing on the subsample of municipalities in these regions, the effect is much larger and
more precisely estimated than for the overall sample (results available upon request).
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party displays a significant coefficient prior to the introduction of Mediaset, and only the PSI
exhibits a significant (positive) coefficient between 1983 and 1992 - for reasons explained
above - the coefficients for the FI-PDL (black solid circles) are abnormally large, in terms of
both magnitude and statistical significance, in all elections but the last one.
4.2. ALTERNATIVE EMPIRICAL STRATEGIES
The estimated coefficients on Signal in Tables 4 and 5 capture the reduced form (or the
intention-to-treat) effect of early exposure to Mediaset on voting. Ideally, we would like to
estimate instead the effect of signal-driven changes in actual viewership. However, data on
viewership are not available at the municipality-level.
Still, we know from Olken (2009) that potential viewership increases with signal strength as
long as the latter is negative, it reaches 100% when signal equals zero and it remains constant
thereafter. To test whether the documented effect of signal strength on voting is consistent
with such pattern, we estimate a local linear regression (LLR) of the voting for FI in 1994 on
Signal. Figure 3 shows that the relationship between signal strength and voting has a similar
shape to that between signal strength and potential viewership, as documented by Olken
(2009). In particular, it is upward sloped over negative values of signal (when viewership
should also increase), and it remains constant for values of signal strength above zero (when
actual reception should also be constant).
In the right graph of Figure 3 we estimate the LLR separately for negative and positive values
of Signal. The predicted vote differs by about 2 percentage points (statistically significant
at the 1% confidence level) between municipalities with signal intensity just above and just
below Signal = 0, the value for which reception changes from less-than-perfect to perfect.
As long as municipalities with similar values of signal intensity are also similar along other
dimensions, exposure to Mediaset is as good as randomly assigned across municipalities
around the threshold. In the spirit of regression discontinuity analysis (Lee and Lemieux,
2010), we can thus attribute the discrete change in the predicted vote share to the causal
effect of exposure. 14
In the same vein, we restrict the analysis to pairs of adjacent municipalities in which one of
the two has positive signal intensity (i.e. perfect reception) and the other one has negative
signal intensity (i.e. imperfect or nil reception). Overall we identify 3,021 such neighbor-
pairs. The means’ comparison tests in column 1 of Table 7 confirm that, even within this
14 Of course, the threshold Signal = 0 approximates with some unavoidable error the level of signal intensity
that allows for perfect reception. If anything, however, this should bias the estimate downward.
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sub-sample, municipalities with perfect reception of Mediaset channels display significantly
higher vote shares for Berlusconi’s parties, relative to those with only imperfect reception.
The bottom part of Table 7 compares several socio-economic characteristics between ex-
posed and non-exposed municipalities within the restricted sample of neighbor-pairs (anal-
ogously to what we did in Table 2 for the whole sample of the OLS regressions). Although
the two groups are balanced in terms of most variables, exposed municipalities seem sig-
nificantly larger (both in terms of population and electorate) and exhibit higher educational
attainment. For this reason, we further restrict the sample to pairs of neighbor municipali-
ties with a difference in SignalFree lower than 1 or 0.5. In this way, we approximate the
ideal experiment of comparing municipalities that are equally distant from transmitters, so
that any difference in reception is solely due to idiosyncratic geomorphological factors. This
further restriction increases difference in electoral support for the FI-PDL to about 1 percent-
age point (a magnitude that is remarkably similar to that estimated by the OLS regressions),
while eliminating at the same time any residual difference in terms of other municipality
characteristics, see columns 2 and 3 of Table 7.
In the last three columns of the table we control in addition for territory characteristics (area,
altitude and ruggedness) and neighbor-pair fixed effects. The latter keep constant any other
(possibly unobserved) characteristic in common between each two adjacent municipalities.15
The inclusion of pair fixed effects and of the additional controls greatly improves on the
precision of the estimates (the standard errors in columns 4-6 are much smaller than those
in columns 1-3); apart from that, the results largely confirm those based on simple mean
comparisons.
More in general, the results obtained using these alternative methods are very similar (also
in terms of magnitude) to the OLS estimates on the full sample of municipalities. In the
rest of the paper, we thus discuss only the OLS estimates obtained on the full sample of
municipalities.
4.3. HETEROGENEITY
One potential issue with the OLS estimates concerns the weighting scheme. In the presence
of heterogeneous effects, weighting by population guarantees the representativeness of the
estimated coefficient at the national level; on the other hand, one may worry that the results
are driven by the relationship between exposure to Mediaset and voting in a few large cities.
To address this concern, in Table 8 we first re-estimate our baseline specification on the
15 See Acemoglu et al. (2012) for a similar approach.
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unweighted observations (column 1); then, we restrict the sample to smaller municipalities
(columns 2 to 5).16
The coefficient on Signal in the unweighted regression is slightly larger than the weighted
one. Most importantly, the point estimate is very similar for municipalities with different
population size, and increases strongly only when we focus on the very small ones (less than
500 inhabitants). These results further confirm that the effect of signal strength is capturing
variation across a multitude of small cities with scattered access to Mediaset (rather than
being driven by a handful of large cities).
In columns 6 to 8 we also estimate separate regressions for municipalities in the North,
Center and South. We find evidence of a considerable heterogeneity across macro-regions:
the effect is small and not statistically significant in the North; it is very large and statistically
significant in the South; and it takes intermediate values in the Center, very close to the
average effect at the national level.
It is instructive to relate such differences to the observed patterns in TV consumption prior
to the advent of Mediaset, as it seems natural to expect a larger impact of potential exposure
in areas where people actually watched more TV. Appendix Table A.2 reports the average
number of hours spent watching TV in municipalities of different size and in different macro-
regions, based on a survey on media consumption conducted by ISTAT on a representative
sample of the Italian population in 1983 (ISTAT, 1985). The pattern of TV consumption
across different sub-samples lines up nicely with the estimated coefficient of Signal: there
are in fact no significant differences in average TV viewership between municipalities of
different size, while respondents in the North report watching fewer hours of TV than those
in the Center and South. A graphical representation of the relation between the effect of
early exposure to Mediaset and pre-existing TV consumption patterns is provided in Figure
4.17
We next explore survey data that combine detailed information on political views and a rich
set of individual characteristics, allowing us to explore additional dimensions of heterogene-
ity in the effect of Mediaset.
16 All regressions in Table 8 use the specification in the last column of Table 5, pooling together all elections in
the 1994-2013 period and including year fixed-effects. We obtain analogous results when running separate
regressions for each election year.
17 No information on viewership rates is available for municipalities with less than 500 inhabitants.
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4.4. INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL RESULTS
The Italian National Election Study (ITANES) is a series of pre- and post-electoral surveys
conducted on a representative sample of the Italian population in coincidence with national
parliamentary elections since 1972. For our analysis we focus on the surveys conducted in
1994, 1996, 2001 and 2006. Between 2,000 and 3,000 individuals were interviewed in each
wave, for a total of 10,317.
The surveys contains detailed information on the respondents’ (self-reported) voting choice,
opinion on political leaders, degree of political participation, sources of political informa-
tion, media consumption, and a range of individual characteristics including age, gender,
education, employment and marital status. Crucially, the survey also reports the code of the
municipality where the respondent resides (1878 municipalities in total), which allows us to
assign to each respondent a value for Mediaset pre-1985 signal intensity.
In Table 9 we explore the relation between pre-1985 access to Mediaset and various indi-
vidual outcomes. We first examine whether individual-level analysis confirms the positive
association between early exposure to Mediaset and voting for Berlusconi’s party. To do so,
in column 1 we regress a dummy variable for voting for Forza Italia on Signal, SignalFree,
all municipal controls included in our baseline municipal regressions (area, area squared,
altitude, altitude squared, ruggedness, income, education), a range of individual controls
(gender, age, education, employment, marital status, and household size), and election-year
fixed effects. The results confirm that individuals living in areas that had access to Mediaset
prior to 1985 are more likely to vote for Berlusconi’s party (coefficient of 0.033 significant
at the 1% level). Since many electoral districts and local labor markets include only a few
respondents, this first specification does not include the full set of fixed effects used in our
municipal regressions. Instead, in column 2 we include fixed effects for 110 provinces (the
administrative level just above municipalities) and find that the effect of Signal on the propen-
sity to vote for Forza Italia remains positive and significant (at the 10% level). According
to the estimated coefficient, a one standard deviation increase in pre-1985 signal intensity
is associated with an increase in the probability of voting for Forza Italia of 2 percentage
points, a magnitude that is comparable to that estimated in the municipal regressions.
The use of individual data also allows us to shed some light on why early exposure to Me-
diaset has such a persistent effect. In particular, using information on the respondents’ year
of birth, we can examine whether this effect is more pronounced for individuals that were
exposed to Mediaset content at younger ages. In columns 3 and 4 of Table 9 we estimate
our baseline specification only on the sample of individuals that voted for the first time in
1994, when Berlusconi first run for office, or later. When focusing on this group of younger
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voters the estimated coefficient is much larger than for the overall sample (almost five-fold in
the specification with province fixed effects, column 4). This pattern is confirmed in Figure
6 which plots the results of a series of analogous regressions estimated separately for the
sample of individuals born after each given year between 1915 and 1981 (hence gradually
excluding older cohorts). Clearly, exposure to Mediaset has a much larger effect on individ-
uals born after 1975, and especially on those that were between 8 and 10 year-old in 1985
(the year our treatment variable refers to).
That the size of the coefficient decreases when focusing on even younger individuals (i.e.
born after 1978, after 1979, etc.) is presumably related to the fact that, as Mediaset cover-
age gradually expanded to the entire territory between 1985 and 1990, the actual length of
differential exposure for these subjects was decreasing; that the precision of the estimates
decreases as we focus on ever younger voters can be instead explained by the fact that the
sample size is gradually shrinking. While this exercise is instructive of the particular vul-
nerability of younger voters to the influence of commercial television, it does not provide
a comprehensive picture of its effect on all age groups. To this end, we divide our sample
in six ten-year birth cohorts and estimate the coefficient on Signal using our baseline spec-
ification separately for each group (see Figure 7). Once again, the results confirm that the
effect of exposure to Mediaset is larger for the youngest cohort (born after 1975) than for
any other.Interestingly, exposure to Mediaset also appears to have a significant positive effect
on older voters (born before 1936), which is not surprising given that the elderly, as well as
the young, tend to spend a relatively high fraction of their time watching TV, see Appendix
Table A.2.
Taken together these results suggest that exposure to Mediaset was especially important in
shaping the views and future political attitudes of individuals in young and very young age.
To the extent that exposure to cultural messages and political rhetoric at early stages of
personal development tends to have long-lasting effects on political behavior (Kaplan and
Mukand, 2011; Yanagizawa-Drott and Madestam, 2011), this could go some way in explain-
ing the persistence of the Mediaset effect.18
Taken together, the results in this section point at the existence of a strong and persistent
link between early exposure to Mediaset content and receptiveness to Berlusconi’s political
message. In the following section we shed light on the possible channel(s) through which
the documented political effect of commercial television may have operated.
18 Our findings are also in line with previous evidence on the impact of exposure to TV in young age on
cognitive and behavioral outcomes (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2008; Huesmann et al., 2003).
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5. CHANNELS
5.1. PARTISAN NEWS BIAS
The evidence presented so far points at significant and persistent effects of early exposure to
Mediaset on political outcomes. In particular, it suggests that individuals in municipalities
with access to Mediaset prior to 1985 were more likely to vote for Berlusconi’s party in 1994,
when he first ran for office, and in subsequent elections.
Previous research has documented that exposure to media can have significant effect on in-
dividual voting behavior and, ultimately, on electoral competition (DellaVigna and Kaplan,
2007; Enikolopov et al., 2011). These contributions have focused exclusively on the impact
of exposure to partisan bias in political news coverage. As discussed in section 2, how-
ever, no newscasts were broadcast on Mediaset until 1991. This was partly due to the fact
that, until 1990, private stations were prohibited from broadcasting live, which made virtu-
ally impossible to transmit news bulletins. Other forms of informative content (i.e. political
talk shows, investigative journalism reports) were similarly scant on Mediaset channels’ pro-
gramming, which consisted primarily of light entertainment programs such as soap operas,
action dramas, quiz and variety shows, cartoons and sport. Figure 8 compares the share of
airtime devoted to different types of programs on Mediaset and RAI channels, as reported by
the statistics on culture assembled by ISTAT (1987). As of 1987, the first year for which data
are available, the share of airtime devoted to all informative programs combined was close
to zero and, given the trend, it was presumably even lower in the years before.
Based on the timing of the introduction of news programs on Mediaset channels, as well as
of the entry of Berlusconi into politics, it seems therefore unlikely that any effect of early
access to Mediaset is due to (differential) exposure to political media bias before 1985. Yet,
it is possible that early Mediaset viewers developed some form of attachment to the network
that made them more likely to watch any Mediaset program, including newscasts once these
were introduced, and hence to be exposed to pro-Berlusconi bias.
Using individual data on news consumption from the ITANES surveys we can test this hy-
pothesis by examining to what extent early access to Mediaset is associated with viewership
of Mediaset news programs in and after 1994. In particular, ITANES respondents were asked
to report whether they watched news on TV and, if so, on what channel. We construct two
dummy variables that equal one if a respondent reports watching news most frequently on
Mediaset and public channels respectively, and use them as dependent variables in our base-
line specification (see last four columns of Table 9). Interestingly, we find no significant
effect of early exposure to Mediaset on the probability of watching news on Mediaset (or
RAI) both for the overall sample, and for younger voters only.
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As an indirect test of the news bias channel, we also look at differences in beliefs about
Berlusconi between early and late Mediaset viewers. Indeed, if early viewers were exposed
to more favorable coverage of Forza Italia and of its leader, one would expect to observe
systematic differences in the evaluation of Berlusconi between the two groups. Luckily,
some questions in the ITANES surveys provide the opportunity to explore this aspect; in
some waves, in fact, respondents were asked what their overall evaluation of Berlusconi was
(on a 1-10 scale), and whether they believed him to have each of the following qualities:
honest, qualified, trustworthy, telegenic (2001 and 2006), sincere, coherent, and dependable
(2001 only). In Table 10 we estimate our baseline specification using as dependent variable
the respondents’ overall evaluation of Berlusconi (column 1), a dummy for positive responses
on each personal attribute (columns 2 to 8), and the sum of the binary indicators for all
attributes (column 9). Again, we document no systematic differences between early and late
Mediaset viewers in their evaluation of Berlusconi along any of these dimensions.
Overall, we find little evidence that voters that had access to Mediaset earlier were more
exposed (or vulnerable) to pro-Berlusconi news bias later on, nor that they formed a more
positive opinion of Berlusconi as a person and as a political leader. An alternative interpreta-
tion is that early Mediaset viewers were more likely to vote for Berlusconi not because they
gathered different information about him (or his political platform), but, rather, because they
evaluated this information through a different set of values that commercial TV contributed
to disseminate. We discuss this hypothesis in greater detail in sections 5.2 and 5.3.19
5.2. GENERAL SYMPATHY FOR BERLUSCONI
Another possible explanation of the higher support for Berlusconi’s party among early Me-
diaset viewers is that these individuals developed a special bond with Berlusconi himself -
for example out of gratitude for the unprecedented entertainment opportunities offered by his
network - and were hence more likely to support any initiative he would embark on. Their
support for Forza Italia would hence not reflect a particular affinity to the party’s political
platform but would rather be just another way to express their attachment to Berlusconi.
An indirect way to test this hypothesis is to look at whether early Mediaset viewers were also
more likely to support Berlusconi’s non-political ventures. In particular, we investigate the
19 As mentioned in the introduction, it is important to note that we do not aim to downplay the potential
impact of partisan news bias on voting in the context of Italy (discussed by Durante and Knight, 2012,
and, more recently, by Barone et al., 2012). Rather, we argue that, given the content available on Mediaset
channels in the early stage of their diffusion, an explanation based solely on exposure to partisan news bias
seems insufficient to explain the documented differences in voting behavior between early and late Mediaset
viewers.
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relation between Mediaset access and the evolution of popular support for Milan A.C., the
soccer team acquired by Berlusconi in 1987 and whose triumphs over the following decade
greatly contributed to Berlusconi’s successful public image. To this end we collect compre-
hensive data on the number of Milan A.C. organized supporters’ clubs (Milan clubs) that
were present across Italian municipalities as of 2012 (available from the Italian Association
of Milan Clubs). Furthermore, to account for any systematic differences in the overall pres-
ence of soccer fans, we also collect data on the number of organized supporters’ clubs of
F.C. Internazionale (or Inter), the other top team from Milan comparable to Milan A.C. in
terms of reputation and number of supporters. According to our data there is at least one
Milan Club in 643 municipalities (about 8% of the total), and at least one Inter Club in 811
municipalities (about 10%). To test the relationship between early access to Mediaset and
support for Milan A.C., we construct a dummy variable which equals one for those munici-
palities where at least one Milan club is present and zero otherwise, and regress it on Signal
in a specification identical to that used for the voting regressions. The results are presented
in Table 11: the first specification includes the full set of geographic municipal controls; in
column 2 we also include both electoral district and local labor fixed effects; finally in col-
umn 3 we also control for population, (log) municipal per capita income, and education. In
columns 4 to 6 we estimate the same specifications using as dependent variable a dummy for
the presence of at least one Inter club in a municipality.
We find no evidence of a systematic relation between early access to Mediaset and support
for Berlusconi’s team; if anything, Mediaset signal is associated with higher support for Inter
F.C. (column 4), although this effect too becomes statistically insignificant when fixed effects
and additional controls are included. To the extent that support for his soccer team reflects a
general sympathy towards Berlusconi, the evidence presented does not support the view that
early Mediaset viewers were more supportive of all Berlusconi’s initiatives; it hence seems
like their disproportionate support for Berlusconi’s party might be due to a specific affinity
between Mediaset’s non-informative content and Berlusconi’s political message.
5.3. NON-INFORMATIVE CONTENT AND VALUES
In his seminal work on the decline of social capital in the United States in the post-war period,
Putnam (2000) devotes an entire chapter to discussing the role of television and its impact on
social capital. According to Putnam, both the amount of time spent watching TV and the type
of content viewers are exposed to can influence their degree of civic (dis)engagement. With
regard to the quantity of exposure, Putnam’s intuitive argument is that the more time individ-
uals spend watching TV, the less they will devote to various forms of civic engagement (e.g.
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participation in association, attendance of public meeting, etc.). With regard to the quality of
content, Putnam draws a stark distinction between informative and non-informative content:
at one extreme, news and educational content can in principle foster political participation
and civic engagement; at the other extreme, light entertainment programs can be detrimental
to social capital.
Putnam explicitly classifies specific program categories in terms of their pro-civic potential:
“at the top of the pro-civic hierarchy are news programs and educational television (...) at
the other hand of the scale fell action dramas (exemplified in an earlier era by Hazzard and
Miami Vice), soap-operas (such as Dallas and Melrose Place) and so-called reality TV”.
Strikingly, all these examples of “uncivic” TV shows were introduced in Italy by Mediaset.
More in general, Figure 8 shows that action dramas, soap operas and light entertainment
programs accounted for more than 70% of Mediaset total airtime in the 1980s.
In accordance to Putnam’s argument, one possibility is that the introduction of commercial
TV may have favored a decline in civic engagement both by expanding the quantity and
variety of content available to viewers, and by favoring the diffusion of the least pro-civic
programs. If this was the case, this pattern should presumably have been more pronounced
in areas that had access to Mediaset programs early on. To test this hypothesis in Table 12
we investigate the relation between Mediaset signal intensity prior to 1985 and the evolution
of civic engagement between 1981 and 2001, as measured by the number civic associations.
This is, in fact, the only measure of civic engagement, among those originally suggested by
Putnam, for which municipal data dating back to the 1980s are available. The data come
from the national census and are only available at ten-year intervals (1981, 1991, 2001).
While in the top panel the dependent variable is the number of voluntary associations per
capita, in the bottom panel we use the ratio between the number of voluntary associations
- which the Italian census classifies as economic units - and the total number of economic
units in a municipality.
In the first three columns we regress the number of voluntary associations in each census year
on pre-1985 signal intensity using our baseline specification. Reassuringly, signal strength
in 1985 is not correlated with the number of per capita voluntarily associations in 1981,
i.e. before the expansion of Mediaset (column 1). The relation between the two variables
becomes negative and statistically significant after the introduction of Mediaset, both in 1991
and in 2001 (columns 2 and 3, respectively). These results are suggestive of a decline in civic
engagement - both between 1981 and 1991, and between 1991 and 2001 - in municipalities
that were exposed to Mediaset earlier relative to those that were exposed only later. This
pattern is confirmed in column 4 when we pool together observations for all census years and
interact pre-1985 signal intensity in 1985 with a dummy for the post-1981 period. Finally,
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the effect remains virtually unchanged in column 5 when we also include municipality fixed
effects, hence exploiting only differential changes over time in the same municipality.
With regard to the magnitude of the effect, a one standard deviation increase in signal in-
tensity is associated with a decline in civic engagement of 3.5 voluntarily associations per
10,000 inhabitants or, equivalently, 6.2 associations per 1,000 economic units. These are
sizeable effects, corresponding respectively to 40 and 36 percent of the standard deviation in
the number of voluntary associations per capita and per economic unit in 1981.
Overall, the results in Table 12 suggest that municipalities that were exposed to Mediaset
before 1985 experienced a decline in civic engagement over the following years, relative
to municipalities that were exposed only later on. Although we are not in the position to
distinguish what part of the documented effect may be due to an increase in TV consumption
rather than to changes in the type of content, both these two mechanisms would be consistent
with Putnam’s argument.
5.4. VALUES AND VOTING
Why would the diffusion of a culture of individualism and civic disengagement, favored by
the advent of commercial TV, result in increased electoral support for Berlusconi’s party?
Considering the specificity of Berlusconi’s political rhetoric and his contentious views on
issues such as corruption, tax evasion, or gender equality, it is not unreasonable to believe
that individuals subscribing to pro-civic values would find his political message unattractive,
and vice versa. Indeed, extensive anecdotal evidence attests to substantially different views
between Berlusconi’s political supporters and opponents on a range of culturally charged is-
sues which often transcend, and in some cases go against, the traditional right-left ideological
divide.
The ITANES data allow us to explore this issue more systematically, as the survey includes
a range of questions that allows for the construction of individual measures of civic en-
gagement analogous to those used by Putnam (2000). In particular, respondents are asked
whether they belong to any voluntary association, whether they are interested in politics, sign
petitions, attend public meetings and demonstrations. Based on the response to each of these
questions we attempt to characterize Forza Italia’s voters along these dimensions of civic
engagement. Specifically, in Table 14, we regress a dummy for voting for Forza Italia on
various measures of political and social engagement (both separately and jointly), control-
ling for baseline individual characteristics, and electoral year fixed effects. Since in this case
we are exploiting variation at the individual level, we also include municipality fixed effects.
The results suggest that, relative to the average individual in each municipality, Forza Italia
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voters are significantly less likely to participate in voluntary associations (column 1 and 7),
and tend to be significantly less interested and actively engaged in politics (columns 2 to 6).
Although these findings can hardly be given a causal interpretation, the evidence is consis-
tent with the view that Forza Italia is especially popular among segments of the population
characterized by low levels of civic engagement, so it may have benefited from the decline
in social capital triggered by the diffusion of Mediaset content.
To further corroborate these findings, we finally examine the relationship between civic en-
gagement and voting for Forza Italia at the municipal level. To do so we combine data on
electoral outcomes for all elections between 1994 and 2006 with census data on the number
of civic associations in 1991 and 2001. In the first row of Table 15 we regress the average
vote share of each main party on the number of per capita voluntary associations in the clos-
est census year and our baseline set of controls.20 The results confirm that Berlusconi’s party
enjoys significantly higher electoral support in areas with relatively low levels of civic en-
gagement. Furthermore, Forza Italia displays the largest coefficient among all parties, most
of which, both on the right and on the left, tend to receive lower support in areas with low
civic engagement.
The relation between civic engagement and voting for Forza Italia seems quite general and
not driven by exposure to Mediaset. Evidence of this is provided in the second row where we
restrict the sample to municipalities with pre-1985 signal intensity above 0, that is, munici-
palities that should not differ much in exposure to Mediaset. When doing so the qualitative
results remain very similar and, if anything, the pattern documented in the first row becomes
even more extreme. Finally, to make sure that the results are not driven by differences in un-
observable municipal characteristics, in the lower panel of Table 15, we replicate the analysis
including municipality fixed effects, thus identifying the effect only from variation in voting
and civic engagement over time within the same municipality. When doing so the qualitative
results remain unchanged while the magnitude of all coefficients increases.
6. CONCLUSION
Mass media can have a profound impact on individual socio-cultural attitudes. Exposure to
television, for example, can discourage participation in the local community and favor civic
disengagement (Putnam, 2000; Olken, 2009); this, in turn, can translate into an electoral
advantage for those political forces whose platform is more in line with the cultural values
put forth by TV.
20 We use the number of voluntary associations reported in the 1991 census for the elections in 1994 and 1996,
and that reported in the 2001 census for the elections of 2001 and 2006.
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In this paper we examine how the introduction of commercial TV has influenced the co-
evolution of civic values and political preferences in Italy over the past three decades. We
first document that Italian municipalities that were first exposed to Berlusconi’s commercial
TV network, Mediaset, in the early 1980s displayed higher electoral support for Berlusconi’s
party once he entered politics, in 1994, and in the following decades. The difference in vot-
ing behavior between early and late Mediaset viewers cannot be explained by differential
exposure to pro-Berlusconi bias in news coverage; in fact, news programs were only intro-
duced on Mediaset in 1991, when the network was already available to the entire population.
Instead, we suggest that the sort of non-informative content introduced on Mediaset chan-
nels, favored the diffusion of a culture of individualism and civic disengagement that, later
on, would make voters more receptive to Berlusconi’s political message. In line with this ar-
gument, we document that areas that had access to Mediaset earlier on experienced a marked
decline in civic engagement in the following decades relative to those that did not.
Overall, our results confirm previous findings on the role of media, and television in partic-
ular, as an important determinant of socio-political attitudes. Most importantly, our study
is the first one to show that, even in the absence of overt news bias, television may have
far-reaching effects on individual political preferences through the diffusion of new cultural
models. To the extent that socio-cultural attitudes tend to evolve very slowly, it may take time
for the effect of media-fueled cultural models to unravel. For the same reason, however, the
consequences on social and political outcomes may be especially profound and long-lasting.
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FIGURES AND TABLES
Figure 1: Timeline of events, 1980-1994
1980 1985 1991 1987 1992 1994 1990 
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Figure 2: Geographic distribution of Mediaset signal intensity in 1985
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(b) Signal free
The maps represent the geographic distribution of the simulated intensity of Mediaset’s signal in 1985 respectively
under real conditions (left), and in the absence of geomorphological obstacles (right).
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Figure 3: Mediaset signal intensity in 1985 and voting for Forza Italia in 1994 (local linear regressions)
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The graph on the left summarizes the results of the estimation of a local linear regression of Forza Italia’s vote share on
Mediaset signal intensity in 1985 (controlling for all baseline controls). The graph on the right summarizes the results of
a similar exercise; in this case however we estimate the local linear regression separately for negative and positive values
of signal intensity.
Figure 4: Mediaset signal intensity, voting for Forza Italia and TV consumption
The graphs above report the estimated coefficients (and respective confidence intervals) of a series of regressions of Forza
Italia’s vote share on Mediaset signal intensity in 1985 (controlling for all baseline controls) for different samples of
municipalities divided by size of the population (<500K, <50k, <5k) and macro-geographic areas (North, Center, South).
For each sample, the corresponding columns report the share of the population watching TV for less than 2 hours per day
(dark grey), between 3 and 4 hours per day (light grey), and 5 or more hours per day (white).
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Figure 5: Mediaset signal intensity and voting for all parties (1976-2013)
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The graph summarizes the results of a series of regressions of vote share on Mediaset signal
intensity in 1985 for all main parties in all elections between 1976 and 2006 (controlling for all
baseline controls). It reports on the horizontal axis the magnitude of the estimated coefficient,
and on the vertical axis the corresponding t-statistic. The results for the elections held between
1976 and 1979 are indicated with Xs, those for the elections held between 1983 and 1992 with
hollow circles, and those for the elections held between 1994 and 2006 with solid circles. Finally,
the black solid circles indicate the estimated coefficients for Forza Italia.
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Figure 6: Effect of Signal on voting for Forza Italia for increasingly younger voters
The graph reports the estimated coefficients (and respective confidence intervals) of a series of re-
gressions of reported voting for Forza Italia on Mediaset signal intensity in 1985, for different sam-
ples of individuals born after each given year between 1915 and 1982 (hence gradually excluding
older cohorts). All regressions include the following individual and municipal controls: Education,
Gender, Age, Employment status,Marital status, Number of family members, Signal free, Education,
Log Income per capita, Area Area2, Altitude, Altitude2, Ruggedness.
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Figure 7: Effect of Signal on voting for Forza Italia by 10-year birth cohorts
The graph reports the estimated coefficients (and respective confidence intervals) of a series of re-
gressions of reported voting for Forza Italia on Mediaset signal intensity in 1985, for six ten-year
birth cohorts: individuals born before 1936, between 1936 and 1945, between 1946 and 1955, be-
tween 1956 and 1965, between 1966 and 1975, and after 1975. All regressions include the following
individual and municipal controls: Education, Gender, Age, Employment status, Marital status,
Number of family members, Signal free, Education, Log Income per capita, Area Area2, Altitude,
Altitude2, Ruggedness.
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Figure 8: Share of airtime devoted to different types of programs on Mediaset and RAI (1987-1997)
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
unweighted weighted by 1981 population
obs. mean st.dev. median obs. mean st.dev. median
Signal 8086 -0.398 1.017 -0.234 8062 0.008 0.831 0.013
SignalFree 8086 -0.063 1.001 -0.246 8062 0.358 1.155 0.208
Signal>0 8095 0.313 0.464 0.000 8062 0.516 0.500 1.000
Population (1000s) 1981 8062 7.010 45.449 2.296 8062 301.6 683.7 24.4
Area (100s km2) 8093 0.372 0.499 0.218 8062 1.557 2.829 0.627
Electorate (1000s) 1994 8014 6.034 36.042 2.070 7988 239.0 548.5 21.8
Voting turnout 1994 8014 84.2 10.5 87.6 7988 85.9 7.8 88.1
FI 1994 8014 18.9 7.8 19.4 7988 19.5 8.2 19.7
FI 1996 8014 17.9 6.3 17.3 7987 19.2 6.4 18.2
FI 2001 8014 26.5 7.9 26.7 7985 27.1 6.7 27.1
FI 2006 8016 22.9 7.2 23.0 7986 22.9 6.1 22.4
PDL 2008 8089 33.7 10.1 33.5 8059 35.9 8.9 35.7
PDL 2013 8016 20.8 6.8 20.4 7988 20.8 6.1 20.0
Sub-sample: Signal   0
FI 1994 2523 20.8 7.1 21.2 2512 21.1 7.4 20.9
FI 1996 2523 18.9 6.1 18.1 2512 20.1 6.7 18.9
FI 2001 2523 28.6 7.1 28.9 2510 28.3 6.4 28.3
FI 2006 2523 23.9 6.5 24.0 2510 23.5 5.8 22.7
PDL 2008 2527 35.5 9.2 34.6 2514 37.1 8.5 37.5
PDL 2013 2523 22.0 6.3 21.2 2512 21.2 5.9 20.0
Sub-sample: Signal < 0
FI 1994 5491 18.1 8.0 18.6 5476 17.7 8.5 18.6
FI 1996 5491 17.4 6.3 16.9 5475 18.3 5.8 17.3
FI 2001 5491 25.6 8.0 25.6 5475 25.8 6.9 25.3
FI 2006 5493 22.5 7.4 22.4 5476 22.3 6.4 21.8
PDL 2008 5562 32.9 10.4 33.0 5545 34.6 9.2 33.7
PDL 2013 5493 20.3 7.0 19.9 5476 20.4 6.3 19.7
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Table 3: Mediaset signal intensity and voting for all parties (1976-1992)
Dependent variable: party vote share
MSI PLI DC PRI PSDI PSI PCI RP others null turnout
Before Mediaset
1976 0.123 -0.101 -0.008 -0.043 0.166 0.243 -0.375 -0.023 -0.069 0.094* 0.029(0.166) (0.070) (0.452) (0.115) (0.182) (0.283) (0.592) (0.018) (0.159) (0.056) (0.232)
1979 -0.003 -0.096 -0.021 -0.063 0.253 0.355 -0.450 -0.010 -0.040 0.079 0.181(0.159) (0.081) (0.465) (0.156) (0.182) (0.253) (0.543) (0.036) (0.150) (0.067) (0.328)
After Mediaset
1983 0.100 -0.144 -0.229 0.186 0.192 0.431* -0.487 0.037 -0.125 0.037 0.094(0.137) (0.118) (0.433) (0.135) (0.241) (0.250) (0.559) (0.028) (0.195) (0.074) (0.311)
1987 -0.100 -0.040 -0.322 -0.025 0.247 0.613** -0.499 0.037 0.009 0.084 0.088(0.183) (0.100) (0.407) (0.130) (0.210) (0.289) (0.507) (0.037) (0.163) (0.066) (0.305)
1992 0.202 -0.107 -0.631 0.005 -0.055 0.637** -0.033 0.042* -0.129 0.070 0.179(0.169) (0.132) (0.392) (0.139) (0.281) (0.284) (0.361) (0.023) (0.218) (0.072) (0.299)
The table reports the estimated coefficient of Mediaset signal intensity in 1985 on the vote share of all main parties in
all elections held between 1976 and 1992. Each row indicates an election year and each column a party (results for vote
share of other parties, share of spoiled ballots and turnout are also reported). All regressions include electoral district
and local labor market fixed effects, alongside the following municipal controls: SignalFree, Electorate, Log income per
capita, Education, Area, Area2, Altitude, Altitude2, Ruggedness. A short description of parties’ characteristics is reported
in Table A.3. Observations are weighted by municipality population in 1981. Standard errors clustered at the electoral
district level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 4: Mediaset signal intensity and voting for Forza Italia in 1994 (OLS estimates)
Dependent variable: Forza Italia vote share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Signal 2.842*** 3.205*** 3.651*** 0.897*** 0.851***(0.866) (0.706) (0.762) (0.234) (0.235)
SignalFree -0.289 0.026 -0.664** -0.640**(0.723) (0.475) (0.262) (0.255)
Area (100s km2) -0.973 0.853** 0.873**(0.695) (0.380) (0.404)
Area2 0.030 -0.079 -0.069(0.054) (0.093) (0.093)
Altitude (1000s m) -6.268 -12.732*** -10.975***(4.494) (1.580) (1.626)
Altitude2 -0.074 7.136*** 6.374***(3.961) (1.271) (1.291)
Ruggedness 0.007* -0.002*** -0.002**(0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
Electorate (1000s) -0.004(0.004)
Log income per capita (1000s e) 5.115***(0.764)
Education -0.088***(0.030)
Constant 19.729*** 19.808*** 21.302*** 23.532*** 14.998***(0.568) (0.578) (0.751) (2.589) (2.906)
Observations 7,583 7,583 7,573 7,573 7,502
Electoral district FEs NO NO NO YES YES
Local labor market FEs NO NO NO YES YES
Year FE NO NO NO NO YES
R2 0.050 0.051 0.108 0.918 0.921
Signal and Signal free represent the simulated intensity of Mediaset’s signal in 1985, under real conditions
and in the absence of geomorphological obstacles respectively. Area, Altitude, Area2, and Altitude2 rep-
resent the municipality’s surface and average altitude and the respective squared terms. Ruggedness is the
municipality’s average terrain ruggedness index. Electorate is the number of eligible voters in the concerned
elections. Log income per capita is the logarithm of per capita income in 1985. Education is the share of
the population with at least a high-school diploma. Observations are weighted by municipality population
in 1981. Standard errors clustered at the electoral district level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
44
Ta
bl
e
5:
M
ed
ia
se
ts
ig
na
li
nt
en
si
ty
an
d
vo
tin
g
fo
rF
or
za
Ita
lia
19
94
-2
01
3
(O
LS
es
tim
at
es
)
D
ep
en
de
nt
va
ria
bl
e:
Fo
rz
a
Ita
lia
vo
te
sh
ar
e
19
94
19
96
20
01
20
06
20
08
20
13
19
94
-2
01
3
S i
gn
al
0.
85
0*
**
0.
70
5*
**
0.
84
2*
**
0.
94
8*
**
0.
99
1*
**
0.
18
8
0.
66
6*
**
(0
.2
35
)
(0
.2
04
)
(0
.3
01
)
(0
.2
85
)
(0
.3
37
)
(0
.2
79
)
(0
.2
31
)
C
on
st
an
t
15
.2
16
**
*
10
.8
75
**
*
24
.0
51
**
*
15
.2
74
**
*
30
.4
56
**
*
12
.0
10
**
*
12
.8
36
**
*
(2
.9
15
)
(2
.6
33
)
(3
.2
89
)
(3
.2
81
)
(3
.7
46
)
(3
.9
01
)
(2
.9
96
)
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
7,
50
3
7,
50
2
7,
50
0
7,
50
1
7,
56
5
7,
50
3
45
,0
74
Ye
ar
FE
N
O
N
O
N
O
N
O
N
O
N
O
Y
ES
R
2
0.
92
1
0.
87
3
0.
81
5
0.
79
0
0.
86
2
0.
80
2
0.
71
6
Si
gn
al
re
pr
es
en
ts
th
e
si
m
ul
at
ed
in
te
ns
ity
of
M
ed
ia
se
t’s
si
gn
al
in
19
85
,
un
de
r
re
al
co
nd
iti
on
s.
A
ll
re
gr
es
si
on
s
in
cl
ud
e
el
ec
to
ra
ld
is
tri
ct
an
d
lo
ca
ll
ab
or
m
ar
ke
tfi
xe
d
ef
fe
ct
s
al
on
gs
id
e
th
e
fo
llo
w
in
g
m
un
ic
ip
al
co
nt
ro
ls
:S
ig
na
lf
re
e,
El
ec
to
ra
te
,
Lo
g
in
co
m
e
pe
rc
ap
ita
,E
du
ca
tio
n,
Ar
ea
,A
re
a2
,A
lti
tu
de
,A
lti
tu
de
2 ,
Ru
gg
ed
ne
ss
.T
he
la
st
co
lu
m
n
al
so
in
cl
ud
es
ye
ar
fix
ed
ef
fe
ct
s.
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
ar
e
w
ei
gh
te
d
by
m
un
ic
ip
al
ity
po
pu
la
tio
n
in
19
81
.S
ta
nd
ar
d
er
ro
rs
cl
us
te
re
d
at
th
e
el
ec
to
ra
ld
is
tri
ct
le
ve
li
n
pa
re
nt
he
se
s.
**
*
p<
0.
01
,*
*
p<
0.
05
,*
p<
0.
1.
45
Ta
bl
e
6:
M
ed
ia
se
ts
ig
na
li
nt
en
si
ty
an
d
vo
tin
g
fo
ra
ll
pa
rti
es
(1
99
4-
20
13
)
D
ep
en
de
nt
va
ria
bl
e:
pa
rt
y
vo
te
sh
ar
e
FI
-P
D
L
A
N
-P
D
L
N
L
C
EN
TR
E
PD
A
LL
IE
S
LE
FT
ot
he
rs
nu
ll
tu
rn
ou
t
19
94
0.
85
0*
**
0.
33
2
-0
.2
67
**
-0
.1
78
-0
.4
01
-0
.1
62
-0
.3
28
**
0.
02
9
0.
12
6
0.
30
5
(0
.2
35
)
(0
.3
29
)
(0
.1
28
)
(0
.2
66
)
(0
.3
81
)
(0
.1
23
)
(0
.1
52
)
(0
.2
00
)
(0
.1
27
)
(0
.3
33
)
19
96
0.
70
5*
**
0.
39
8
-0
.7
95
**
*
-0
.2
21
-0
.4
79
-0
.0
55
-0
.2
08
0.
13
2
0.
12
2
0.
44
6
(0
.2
04
)
(0
.2
50
)
(0
.2
92
)
(0
.1
60
)
(0
.3
29
)
(0
.1
52
)
(0
.1
54
)
(0
.0
93
)
(0
.1
37
)
(0
.3
91
)
20
01
0.
84
2*
**
0.
04
2
-0
.2
79
*
-0
.1
85
-0
.4
22
-0
.0
97
-0
.2
05
0.
13
4
0.
04
4
0.
34
4
(0
.3
01
)
(0
.2
04
)
(0
.1
49
)
(0
.1
98
)
(0
.2
88
)
(0
.1
99
)
(0
.1
61
)
(0
.0
98
)
(0
.1
73
)
(0
.3
89
)
20
06
0.
94
8*
**
0.
12
3
-0
.0
85
-0
.0
18
-0
.5
05
-0
.2
38
-0
.1
91
-0
.0
01
-0
.0
26
0.
23
2
(0
.2
85
)
(0
.1
70
)
(0
.1
61
)
(0
.1
48
)
(0
.3
78
)
(0
.2
34
)
(0
.1
68
)
(0
.0
73
)
(0
.0
49
)
(0
.2
51
)
20
08
0.
99
1*
**
-0
.3
74
-0
.2
51
-0
.6
49
*
-0
.0
16
-0
.1
00
0.
16
2
0.
04
4
0.
19
4
(0
.3
37
)
(0
.2
64
)
(0
.1
71
)
(0
.3
48
)
(0
.1
08
)
(0
.0
87
)
(0
.1
80
)
(0
.0
87
)
(0
.2
30
)
20
13
0.
18
8
-0
.0
89
0.
08
8
-0
.4
35
-0
.1
08
-0
.2
24
**
0.
58
6*
*
-0
.0
17
0.
50
1*
*
(0
.2
79
)
(0
.0
89
)
(0
.1
36
)
(0
.2
74
)
(0
.0
95
)
(0
.0
89
)
(0
.2
57
)
(0
.0
70
)
(0
.2
49
)
19
94
-2
01
3
0.
66
6*
**
0.
18
4
-0
.2
73
**
-0
.0
63
-0
.3
92
-0
.1
32
-0
.1
96
*
0.
17
0*
0.
11
2
0.
24
2
(0
.2
31
)
(0
.2
07
)
(0
.1
29
)
(0
.1
11
)
(0
.2
84
)
(0
.0
96
)
(0
.1
04
)
(0
.0
91
)
(0
.0
81
)
(0
.2
48
)
Th
e
ta
bl
e
re
po
rts
th
e
es
tim
at
ed
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
of
M
ed
ia
se
ts
ig
na
li
nt
en
si
ty
in
19
85
on
th
e
vo
te
sh
ar
e
of
al
lm
ai
n
pa
rti
es
in
al
le
le
ct
io
ns
he
ld
be
tw
ee
n
19
94
an
d
20
13
.
Ea
ch
ro
w
in
di
ca
te
s
an
el
ec
tio
n
ye
ar
an
d
ea
ch
co
lu
m
n
a
pa
rty
(r
es
ul
ts
fo
rv
ot
e
sh
ar
e
of
ot
he
rp
ar
tie
s,
sh
ar
e
of
sp
oi
le
d
ba
llo
ts
an
d
tu
rn
ou
ta
re
al
so
re
po
rte
d)
.A
ll
re
gr
es
si
on
si
nc
lu
de
el
ec
to
ra
ld
is
tri
ct
an
d
lo
ca
ll
ab
or
m
ar
ke
tfi
xe
d
ef
fe
ct
s,
al
on
gs
id
e
th
e
fo
llo
w
in
g
m
un
ic
ip
al
co
nt
ro
ls
:S
ig
na
lF
re
e,
El
ec
to
ra
te
,L
og
in
co
m
e
pe
r
ca
pi
ta
,E
du
ca
tio
n,
Ar
ea
,A
re
a2
,A
lti
tu
de
,A
lti
tu
de
2 ,
Ru
gg
ed
ne
ss
.
A
sh
or
td
es
cr
ip
tio
n
of
pa
rti
es
’c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
s
is
re
po
rte
d
in
Ta
bl
e
A
.3
.
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
ar
e
w
ei
gh
te
d
by
m
un
ic
ip
al
ity
po
pu
la
tio
n
in
19
81
.
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
cl
us
te
re
d
at
th
e
el
ec
to
ra
ld
is
tri
ct
le
ve
li
n
pa
re
nt
he
se
s;
**
*
p<
0.
01
,*
*
p<
0.
05
,*
p<
0.
1.
46
Table 7: Mediaset signal intensity and voting for Forza Italia 1994-2013
(matching estimates)
Mean comparison With FEs and controls
All diff. in SF < 1 diff. in SF < 0.5 All diff. in SF < 1 diff. in SF < 0.5
FI 1994 0.645* 0.808* 0.949* 0.554*** 0.821*** 0.905***(0.346) (0.417) (0.520) (0.139) (0.216) (0.294)
FI 1996 0.701** 0.869** 0.796 0.608*** 0.802*** 0.703**(0.288) (0.381) (0.494) (0.150) (0.220) (0.281)
FI 2001 0.698** 1.052** 1.286** 0.648*** 1.015*** 1.104***(0.340) (0.452) (0.574) (0.180) (0.285) (0.376)
FI 2006 0.605* 0.798* 1.097** 0.560*** 0.803*** 0.965***(0.327) (0.442) (0.541) (0.177) (0.275) (0.354)
PDL 2008 0.424 0.759 1.099 0.375* 0.801** 0.954**(0.445) (0.691) (0.820) (0.216) (0.331) (0.430)
PDL 2013 0.263 0.837 0.765 0.270 0.902*** 0.831**(0.311) (0.518) (0.615) (0.176) (0.289) (0.364)
FI-PDL 1994-2013 0.556** 0.854** 0.998** 0.511*** 0.859*** 0.912***(0.279) (0.377) (0.464) (0.104) (0.157) (0.205)
Electorate, 1000s (1994) 5.689*** -0.246 -0.018 2.440 -0.151 -0.523(2.193) (0.929) (0.902) (1.530) (0.585) (0.495)
Population, 1000s (1981) 6.940** -0.175 -0.039 3.167 -0.039 -0.621(2.766) (1.120) (1.083) (1.978) (0.728) (0.595)
Unemployment rate, % (1991) -0.083 -0.026 -0.075 -0.056 0.073 0.103
(0.256) (0.329) (0.425) (0.116) (0.177) (0.236)
Log per capita income (1985) 0.022 -0.001 0.004 0.016*** -0.001 -0.000(0.015) (0.020) (0.023) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009)
Education (1981) 0.588*** -0.095 -0.145 0.403*** -0.131 -0.254(0.213) (0.246) (0.293) (0.120) (0.168) (0.208)
Firms per capita (1981) -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001* -0.002 -0.002(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Area 0.086 -0.002 0.026(0.055) (0.032) (0.030)
Altitude -0.000 0.007 -0.002(0.013) (0.017) (0.019)
Ruggedness -7.416 -15.946 -16.703(8.145) (11.199) (13.366)
The table illustrates the difference in vote share for Berlusconi’s party (top rows) and in a range of controls (bottom rows) between
neighboring municipalities with Signal above and below zero (i.e. that could and could not receive Mediaset channels in 1985).
The first column reports the coefficients of a series of regressions of the row-variable on a dummy for Signal greater than zero
for the overall sample of neighbor-pairs fulfilling this condition. The second and third columns report analogous coefficients
estimated on the sub-sample of neighbor-pairs with difference in SignalFree respectively smaller than 1 dB and smaller than
0.5 dB (i.e. more and more similar to each other in signal intensity in the absence of geomorphological factors). The last three
columns report the estimated coefficients of similar regressions including neighbor-pair fixed effects, and the following municipal
controls: Area, Area2, Altitude, Altitude2, Ruggedness. Standard errors clustered at the municipality-level in parentheses; ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 9: Mediaset signal intensity, voting and news consumption (individual data)
Voting Forza Italia Favorite Newscast
Full Sample First Vote 1994 Full Sample First Vote 1994
RAI Mediaset RAI Mediaset
Signal 0.033*** 0.020* 0.071** 0.098* -0.020 0.016 -0.096 0.067(0.012) (0.011) (0.035) (0.052) (0.016) (0.016) (0.062) (0.062)
Constant 0.339*** 0.039 0.794*** 0.228 0.353*** 0.643*** 0.337 0.607(0.064) (0.081) (0.207) (0.302) (0.107) (0.108) (0.367) (0.377)
Observations 8127 8127 739 739 7392 7392 687 687
Province FE NO YES NO YES YES YES YES YES
R2 0.042 0.063 0.045 0.084 0.073 0.071 0.078 0.073
Individual data from the 1994, 1996, 2001 and 2006 waves of the Italian National Election Study (ITANES).
In the first four columns the dependent variable is a dummy that equals one for those respondents that report
having voted for Forza Italia and zero otherwise. In the following for columns the dependant variable is
a dummy that equals one for respondents that report their favorite news program to be broadcast on RAI
or Mediaset channels respectively and zero otherwise. Columns 1, 2, 5 and 6 report the results for the
entire sample of respondents, while the other columns only for the sub-sample of individuals voting for
the first time in 1994 or later. All regressions include year fixed effects alongside the following individual
and municipal controls: Education, Gender, Age, Employment status, Marital status, Number of family
members, Signal free, Education, Log income per capita, Area Area2, Altitude, Altitude2, Ruggedness.
Standard errors clustered at the municipal level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 10: Mediaset signal intensity and opinion about Berlusconi (individual data)
Rating Honest Qualified Sincere Trustworthy Coherent Dependable Telegenic Sum quality
Signal 0.088 0.035 0.009 -0.025 0.045* -0.044 -0.085 0.015 0.191(0.077) (0.032) (0.030) (0.042) (0.026) (0.040) (0.056) (0.024) (0.126)
Constant 3.325*** 0.017 0.795*** 0.211 0.169 0.138 0.220 0.842*** 2.236***(0.557) (0.170) (0.154) (0.246) (0.151) (0.211) (0.241) (0.141) (0.724)
Observations 9546 4174 4748 2542 4824 2622 2218 4831 5030
R2 0.119 0.115 0.087 0.095 0.114 0.079 0.134 0.064 0.093
Individual data from the 1994, 1996, 2001 and 2006 waves of the Italian National Election Study (ITANES). Rating indicates the
respondents’ overall evaluation of Berlusconi on a 1-10 scale; Honest, Qualified, Sincere, Trustworthy, Coherent, Dependable,
Telegenic are dummy variables that equal to one if a respondent reported to believe Berlusconi to have that specific quality;
Sum quality is the sum of the binary indicators for all seven attributes. All regressions include year and province fixed effects
alongside the following individual and municipal controls: Education,Gender, Age, Employment status,Marital status, Number
of family members, Signalfree, Education, Log income per capita, Area Area2, Altitude, Altitude2, Ruggedness. Standard errors
clustered at the municipal level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 11: Mediaset signal intensity and support for Milan A.C.
Dependent variable: presence of a team’s organized supporters’ club in the municipality (0-1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Milan A.C. Milan A.C. Milan A.C. Inter F.C. Inter F.C. Inter F.C.
Signal 0.006 0.022 -0.002 0.133*** 0.029 -0.003(0.039) (0.024) (0.023) (0.047) (0.030) (0.028)
SignalFree 0.039 0.007 -0.005 -0.036 -0.011 -0.031(0.038) (0.030) (0.029) (0.041) (0.029) (0.029)
Area (100s km2) 0.226*** 0.300*** 0.176*** 0.233*** 0.406*** 0.224***(0.036) (0.055) (0.053) (0.036) (0.057) (0.054)
Area2 -0.013*** -0.036** -0.020 -0.015*** -0.050*** -0.027**(0.003) (0.015) (0.013) (0.003) (0.015) (0.012)
Altitude (1000s m) -0.343 -0.357** -0.137 -0.693*** -1.146*** -0.749***(0.231) (0.160) (0.161) (0.228) (0.157) (0.156)
Altitude2 0.136 0.247* 0.147 0.336** 0.647*** 0.464***(0.193) (0.128) (0.128) (0.169) (0.128) (0.120)
Ruggedness -0.000* -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Population (1000s) 0.001** 0.001(0.000) (0.001)
Log income per capita (1000s e) 0.042 0.145(0.072) (0.089)
Education (% high-school + college) 0.014*** 0.023***(0.004) (0.005)
Constant 0.251*** -0.146 -0.617** 0.381*** 0.453 -0.556*(0.035) (0.257) (0.285) (0.032) (0.278) (0.294)
Observations 7,641 7,641 7,569 7,641 7,641 7,569
Electoral district FE NO YES YES NO YES YES
Local labor market FE NO YES YES NO YES YES
R2 0.265 0.730 0.740 0.263 0.687 0.707
The table reports the estimated effect of Mediaset signal intensity in 1985 on the presence of Milan A.C. and Inter F.C.
organized supporters’ clubs as of 2012. Area, Altitude, Area2, and Altitude2 represent the municipality’s surface and average
altitude and the respective squared terms. Ruggedness is the municipality’s average terrain ruggedness index. Population is
the municipal population in 1981. Log income per capita is the logarithm of per capita income in 1985. Education is the
share of the population with at least a high-school diploma. Observations are weighted by municipality population in 1981.
Standard errors clustered at the electoral district level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 12: Mediaset signal intensity and number of voluntary associations
1981 1991 2001 1981-2001
Number of voluntary associations per 100 inhabitants
Signal -0.000 -0.020** -0.021** 0.010(0.004) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007)
Post exposure X Signal -0.035*** -0.035***(0.009) (0.007)
Constant 0.111 0.223** 0.448*** 0.118 0.103***(0.081) (0.105) (0.153) (0.075) (0.003)
R2 0.513 0.529 0.734 0.697 0.787
Number of voluntary associations per 100 economic units
Signal -0.047 -0.288** -0.397*** 0.173(0.098) (0.137) (0.147) (0.108)
Post exposure X Signal -0.623*** -0.631***(0.106) (0.073)
Constant 3.724*** 5.328*** 6.832*** 3.705*** 2.090***(1.398) (1.809) (2.142) (1.159) (0.039)
R2 0.447 0.424 0.572 0.540 0.716
Observations 7,561 7,566 7,499 22,626 22,870
Municipal controls YES YES YES YES NO
Electoral districts FEs YES YES YES YES NO
Local Labor Market FEs YES YES YES YES NO
Year FE NO NO NO YES YES
Municipality FE NO NO NO NO YES
In the top panel the dependent variable is the number of voluntary associations in a mu-
nicipality per 100 inhabitants in Census years 1981, 1991 and 2001. In the bottom panel
the dependent variable is the number of voluntary associations in a municipality per 100
economic units in Census years 1981, 1991 and 2001. Post exposure X Signal is the inter-
action between Signal and a dummy variable equal to one for years after 1985. Municipal
controls include Signal free, Electorate, Log income per capita, Education, Area, Area2,
Altitude, Altitude2, Ruggedness. Observations are weighted by municipality population in
1981. Standard errors clustered at the electoral district level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 13: Exposure to Mediaset and membership in associations (individual data)
Voluntary Religious Sport Youth Environment
Signal -0.026*** 0.002 0.016 0.003 0.004
(0.009) (0.010) (0.014) (0.009) (0.008)
Constant -0.145** 0.057 0.192** 0.086 -0.064
(0.071) (0.058) (0.087) (0.068) (0.058)
Observations 7602 7604 7601 5608 7601
R2 0.042 0.046 0.080 0.055 0.029
Individual data from the 1994, 1996, 2001 and 2006 waves of the Italian National Election Study
(ITANES). Voluntary, Religious, Sport, Youth, Environment are dummy variables equal to one if the
respondent reports to be a member of a voluntary, religious, sport, youth or environmental organization
respectively. All regressions include year and province fixed effects alongside the following individual
and municipal controls: Education, Gender, Age, Employment status, Marital status, Number of family
members, Signal free, Education, Log income per capita, Area, Area2, Altitude, Altitude2, Ruggedness.
Standard errors clustered at the municipal level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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APPENDIX
Figure A.1: Distribution of Mediaset signal intensity in 1985
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The figure reports the distribution of 1985 signal intensity across Italian munici-
palities. The dashed red lines indicate the top and bottom 2.5% of the distribution.
Figure A.2: Vote share of the main Italian parties and coalitions (1976-2013)
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Figure A.3: Electoral districts and local labor markets in the region of Abruzzo
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Figure A.4: Example of a technical report sheet for one of 1985 Mediaset’s transmitters
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Table A.2: TV consumption (number of hours watched per day)
Share of individuals in each group by number of hours
Less than 2 3-4 hours 5-6 hours 6+ hours
Overall sample 38.8% 46.7% 11.9% 2.7%
By population size:
Less than 500,000 40.6% 46.1% 12.2% 2.9%
Less than 50,000 39.0% 46.4% 11.9% 2.7%
Less than 5,000 40.8% 43.8% 12.2% 3.2%
By geographical area:
North 43.9% 42.9% 10.6% 2.7%
Centre 38.8% 46.7% 12.5% 2.0%
South 32.2% 51.6% 13.2% 3.0%
By respondent’s age
aged 6-10 27.3% 50.7% 18.7% 3.3%
aged 11-13 24.1% 54.2% 18.2% 3.5%
aged 14-19 31.8% 51.5% 13.8% 2.8%
aged 20-24 38.6% 48.6% 10.4% 2.4%
aged 25-34 41.8% 46.8% 9.8% 1.6%
aged 35-44 47.9% 43.0% 7.3% 1.8%
aged 45-54 44.7% 43.2% 9.7% 2.3%
aged 55-64 36.8% 46.9% 12.8% 3.5%
aged 65+ 38.2% 43.5% 14.2% 4.0%
This table reports the results of a survey conducted by the Italian National Statistical Institute (ISTAT)
in 1983 on the habits and behavior of Italian households, which included a set of question on media
consumption. Each entry of the table indicates the fraction of individuals in each group (rows) spending
a given amount of time watching TV (columns). Source: ISTAT (1985)
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Table A.3: Political Parties in Italy
Name Acronym Foundation Dissolution Description
Movimento Sociale Italiano
(Italian Social Movement)
MSI 26/12/1946 27/1/1995 Neo-fascist political party, founded in 1946 by supporters
of Mussolini; pushed to the sidelines of Italian politics for
several decades, gained some political recognition only in
the 1980s. Best performance: 8.0% in 1972.
Partito Liberale Italiano
(Italian Liberal Party)
PLI 8/10/1922 6/2/1994 Centrist party with rather small electoral support. During
the 1980s formed part of the five-party governing coalition
led by the Christian Democrats. Best performance: 7.0%
in the 1963.
Democrazia Cristiana
(Christian Democrats)
DC 15/12/1942 29/1/1994 Most-voted Italian party in the post-war period with vote
share varying between 30% and 40%. It led the five-party
coalition that governed Italy until 1994 when the party dis-
appeared. Best performance: 48.5% in 1948.
Partito Repubblicano Italiano
(Italian Republican Party)
PRI 21/04/1895 – Centrist party, leaning towards the left or the right depend-
ing on political contingencies. During the 1980s it formed
part of the five-party governing coalition. After 1994, it
joined to the center-left coalition. Best performance: 5.1%
in 1983.
Partito Socialdemocratico Italiano
(Italian Socialist Democratic Party)
PSDI 11/01/1947 – Traditionally a center-left party, formed part of the five-
party ruling coalition in the 1980s. Since the 1990s has
suffered a progressive loss of support. Best performance:
5.1% in 1972.
Partito Socialista Italiano
(Italian Socialist Party)
PSI 14/08/1892 12/11/1994 Traditionally a left-wing party, joined the five-party rul-
ing coalition in the 1980s under the leadership of Bet-
tino Craxi who was elected PM twice. Best performance:
14.2% in 1987.
Partito Comunista Italiano
(Italian Communist Party)
PCI 21/01/1921 03/02/1991 Popular left-wing party with vote share between 25% and
35%. Largest communist party in Western Europe, it rep-
resented the major opposition to the DC-lead center-right
governments. Best performance: 34.6%in 1976.
Partito Radicale
(Italian Radical Party)
PR 05/02/1956 – Traditionally a center-left party, became popular in the
1970s for supporting the referendum campaigns in favor
of divorce and abortion. It supported Berlusconi’s candi-
dacy in 1994 and 1996. Best performance: 3.7% in 1979.
Forza Italia
(Onward Italy)
FI 18/01/1994 27/03/2009 Conservative party founded by Silvio Berlusconi in 1993,
and leading partner of the center-right coalition. Best per-
formance: 29.4% in 2001.
Alleanza Nazionale
(National Alliance)
AN 27/01/1995 22/03/2009 Right-wing party of national-conservative nature. Tradi-
tional electoral partner of Forza Italia participated in all
the governments led by Berlusconi. Best performance:
15.7% in 1996.
Popolo delle Libertà
(People of Freedom)
PDL 27/03/2009 – Created in 2008 from the merger of FI and AN. Best per-
formance: 37.8% in 2008.
Lega Nord (Northern League) LN 04/12/1989 – Right-wing separatist and populist party. Traditional elec-
toral partner of Forza Italia in the North participated in
all the governments led by Berlusconi. Best performance:
10.1% in 1996.
Partito Democratico
(Democratic Party)
PD 03/02/1991 – Emerged from the dissolution of the Communist Party, it
progressively embraced a social democratic and reformist
ideology. It incorporated the centrist Margherita in 2007.
Best performance: 33.2% in 2008.
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